Spotting a Preponderance of the Evidence in the Wild: Inference to the Best Explanation and Sufficiency of the Evidence by Callen, Craig R.
CALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018 10:50 AM 
 
1517 
Spotting a Preponderance of the Evidence in the Wild: 
Inference to the Best Explanation and Sufficiency of the 
Evidence 
Craig R. Callen* 
I.ON QUANTIFICATION.................................................................... 1524 
II.INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION .................................... 1532 
A.  Everyday Life and Sherlock Holmes ............................ 1532 
B.  Inference to the Best Explanation in the Pardo/Allen Theory
 1536 
1.  Professors Pardo and Allen on the Basics of Inference 
to the Best Explanation ........................................... 1536 
2.  Inference to the Best Explanation and Sufficiency of 
Evidence ................................................................. 1537 
3.  Objections to the Pardo/Allen Theory.................... 1539 
4.  Pardo and Allen on the Implications of the Pardo/Allen 
Theory ..................................................................... 1542 
IV.RESEARCH ON PROBLEM-SOLVING, THE STORY MODEL AND 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF ABDUCTION AS SOURCES OF 
DESCRIPTION ........................................................................ 1543 
A.  Stories, Cognition, and Confidence in Judgment ......... 1545 
1.  The Story Model ..................................................... 1546 
2.  Oblique-Stories ....................................................... 1548 
B.  How Theories of Explanation Can Account for Lack of 
Confidence .................................................................... 1549 
C.  The Utility of Burdens and Sufficiency Tests .............. 1552 
1.  As a Guide for Jurors .............................................. 1552 
2.  Sufficiency Tests and Errors of Law ...................... 1555 
D.  Cognition, The Pardo/Allen Theory, and the Court’s View 
of Fact Finding ............................................................. 1557 
1.  The Fact Finder’s Story in St. Mary’s ..................... 1557 
2.  Celotex, Reeves and The Pardo/Allen Theory ....... 1559 
3.  When Evidence or Explanations Are Lacking ........ 1560 
V.AN ALTERNATIVE ....................................................................... 1563 
A.  Optimization Is Not An Option .................................... 1564 
 
* Craig R. Callen (1950-2008), Professor, Michigan State University College of Law.  
CALLEN_FORMATTED.DOCXCALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:50 AM 
1518 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1517 
B.  Employing ‘Story’ or ‘Explanation’ in Preponderance 
Instructions ................................................................... 1566 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1567 
 
When facts are in dispute, the enforcement of legal rights depends on 
standards of proof.  Such standards tell fact finders (who are seldom 
completely certain of the facts) how to resolve issues of fact even though 
they are uncertain.  The typical standard in civil litigation is that the party to 
whom the burden of persuasion is allocated must prove its contention by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Wigmore doubted that verbal explanations 
of the preponderance of the evidence standard were necessary, or even 
helpful.  He said that the “simple and suggestive phrase [preponderance of 
the evidence] has not been allowed to suffice; and in many precedents sundry 
other phrases—’satisfied,’ ‘convinced,’ and the like—have been put forward 
as equivalents, and their propriety as a form of words discussed and 
sanctioned or disapproved, with much waste of judicial effort.”1  If his 
confidence in the clarity of the term was ever justified, it is no more.  
“Preponderance” is at best an uncommon word nowadays.  Moreover, issues 
such as whether mathematical models should guide jury deliberations put 
considerable strain on that “simple and suggestive phrase.” 
Professor Ronald Allen has championed a comparative interpretation 
of the preponderance test.2  In a recent article, Juridical Proof and the Best 
Explanation,3 Professor Michael Pardo and Professor Allen offer a new 
variation of the comparative model.  They contend that, with respect to the 
preponderance standard, judges should instruct jurors to “select the best 
explanation of the evidence (or the most plausible version of the litigated 
events) and that something has been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence if it is part of their selected explanation or version of events.”4  With 
respect to summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law, they take 
the position that “a judge ought to grant such a motion only if a jury would 
have to find one side’s explanation more plausible than the other side’s 
 
 1  9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 325–26 (3d ed. 1940).  
 2  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 
425–34 (1986); Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof:  A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 254, 273 (1997) (“[W]hen a plaintiff produces evidence 
of some state or states of affair that are favourable to its claim, that is sufficient, until the 
defense produces some to the contrary, and so on.  This in turn means that legal proof is 
comparative: the question is the relative plausibility of the parties’ cases; the question is not 
the cardinal probability, conceived as a relative frequency or a subjective belief state, of a 
certain state of affairs.”).  
 3  Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 
LAW & PHIL. 223 (2007). 
 4  Id. at 266–67. 
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explanation.”5 
Even though Pardo and Allen advocate a comparative understanding of 
the preponderance test, they accept a “typical” pattern jury instruction 
explanation of the preponderance standard:  “‘When you have considered all 
the evidence in the case, you must be persuaded that it is more probably true 
than not true.’”6  That does not sound particularly like a comparative 
standard.  It seems to fit better with a more conventional explanation of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, “Preponderance is not a 
comparative standard as such: The question is not whether plaintiff’s case is 
better than defendant’s, but whether the evidence makes the points that the 
plaintiff must prove more probable than not.”7  The prime significance of the 
difference between the two is that Pardo and Allen’s suggested instruction 
on the preponderance of the evidence test would require jurors to find in 
favor of the party with the burden of proof when the best explanation favored 
that party, even though the jurors considered that explanation (or the 
evidence that supported it) insufficient to warrant a verdict.8 
 
 5  Id. at 264–65.  
 6  Id. at 266 (quoting FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 34).  
 7  “[T]his standard means the jury is persuaded (acting as reasonable persons) that the 
points to be proved are more probably so than not. . . . At least in theory, it is satisfied if the 
factfinder believes by the thinnest conceivable margin that the points to be proved are so, and 
anything less would not be a standard of proof at all . . .” 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD 
C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 3:5, at 437–38 (2007) (footnotes omitted).  Often, 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, it is assumed that the trier of fact piles up the 
evidence arguably on the plaintiff’s side and the evidence arguably on the defendant’s side 
and determines which pile is greater.  Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1969) (noting 
“the accuracy of the observation of commentators that ‘the preponderance test is susceptible 
to the misinterpretation that it calls on the trier of fact merely to perform an abstract weighing 
of the evidence in order to determine which side has produced the greater quantum, without 
regard to its effect in convincing his mind of the truth of the proposition asserted” (quoting 
Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. 
L. Q. no. 4 (1967) at 26)).  In fact, a more accurate notion of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is “evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more 
probable than not.”  United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(some citations and footnotes omitted).  For a slightly different approach, see, for example, 2 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 at 484 (Kenneth S. Broun, et al. 6th Practitioners ed. 2006) 
(“The most acceptable meaning to be given to the expression, proof by a preponderance seems 
to be proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable 
than its nonexistence.  Thus the preponderance of evidence becomes the trier’s belief in the 
preponderance of probability.”) (citing MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 1.3; EDMUND 
MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 8485 (1956)). 
 8 Neither of those two approaches fits well with the heuristic approach that many courts 
and some commentators use, conceiving of a preponderance of evidence as anything greater 
than 50%. Where “50%” is merely an analogy to a state of cognitive agnosticism (where the 
trier finds no party’s evidence and argument superior to the others’), it becomes very 
problematic when one considers questions such as those in the debates over the use of 
mathematical models at trial and the sufficiency of so-called “naked” statistical evidence to 
support a verdict.  
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Moreover, their approach to summary judgments and other tests of the 
sufficiency of the evidence does not seem to fit with the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in Celotex Corporation v. Catrett,9 and Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, Inc.10  Each of those cases permits the court to enter 
judgment against the nonmoving party for insufficiency of evidence without 
considering evidence and explanations in favor of the moving party.11  Of 
course, it is not unknown for conventional approaches to be wrong, or 
confused, and Pardo and Allen undoubtedly think that non-comparative 
approaches to the preponderance tests are in error.  This paper will argue that 
the conventional understanding, viewed in light of studies of inference under 
uncertainty, seems superior to the approach that Professors Pardo and Allen 
take. 
These flaws are unfortunate, because the theory Professors Pardo and 
Allen advance is very interesting, particularly its reliance on inference to the 
best explanation, a form of non-deductive reasoning.12  That is to say that 
inference to the best explanation does not guarantee the truth of its 
conclusions,13 although conclusions based upon it may well be adequately 
warranted.14  (I will use the term “the Pardo/Allen Theory” to distinguish 
their theory from the actual practice of inference to the best explanation, or 
from scholarly commentary on that process with which they may not 
agree.)15  They view the process of inference to the best explanation in 
litigation as occurring in two steps.  The first is generation of potential 
explanations of the evidence—typically a process that the parties to a dispute 
initiate, but one to which the fact finders contribute.  Then the triers of fact 
select “the best explanation from the list of potential ones as an actual 
explanation or the truth.”16  While they rely on the reader’s intuitive sense of 
what an explanation is, they note that the context in which one makes 
 
 9  477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 10  530 U.S. 133 (2000).  
 11  Merely asserting that the non-moving party had insufficient evidence could not count 
as an explanation, or else making an inference to the best explanation would merely mean 
deciding in favor of the party with the best argument.  In that case, inference to the best 
explanation would not add anything to what we already know.  
 12  For illustrations see infra Section II, part A. 
 13  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 227.  
 14  Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88, 90–91 
(1965).  
 15  On possible differences between the Pardo/Allen theory and the process of inference 
to the best explanation, see, for example, Larry Laudan, Strange Bedfellow: Inference to the 
Best Explanation and the Criminal Standard of Proof, 11 INT’L J. EVIDENCE. & PROOF 292, 
300 (2007) (contending that the reasonable doubt standard is not, contrary to Pardo and 
Allen’s theory, consistent with inference to the best explanation because the reasonable doubt 
standard prohibits a conviction where there is a reasonable explanation in favor of the 
defendant, regardless of whether it is the best explanation) 
 16  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229.  
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inferences will tend to suggest the characteristics of acceptable 
explanations.17 
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation analyzes, as the title suggests, 
the entire process of proof.  In the process it naturally devotes significant 
attention to the standards of proof.  I will focus on the preponderance 
standard since (i) it seems to be the standard of proof that would reflect 
inference to the best explanation, if any does,18 and (ii) courts often pose it 
in terms that might sound quantitative, for example, as requiring the party 
bearing the burden to prove that its contentions are more likely than not the 
case, or more likely so than not so.19 
Formulations of the preponderance test in terms of likelihood or 
probability, such as “When you have considered all the evidence in the case, 
you must be persuaded that it is more probably true than not true,”20 have 
tempted advocates of the use of mathematical models of evidence over the 
last few decades to make the argument that statistical norms should govern 
fact finding or formulation of evidentiary rules.  Pardo and Allen’s piece is, 
in significant part, a criticism of such models.  Issues about the 
preponderance standard arose most starkly in discussions of the sufficiency 
of so-called “naked” or exclusively statistical evidence,21 often presented 
through the “blue bus” hypothetical.  Those discussions raised two specific 
questions that are particularly salient here:  First, what sort of superiority of 
evidence (or inferences from it) is necessary for a preponderance of 
evidence?  Second, and related, what sort of superiority of evidence or 
likelihood of inferences is necessary to justify a directed verdict or summary 
judgment?  I will argue that the Pardo/Allen theory’s response to each of 
them is flawed. 
 
 
 
 17  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229 & n.17. 
 18  See, e.g., Laudan, supra note 15 at 300 (arguing that the reasonable doubt standard 
does not reflect inference to the best explanation in that the reasonable doubt test requires a 
verdict for the defense if any reasonable explanation would be in defendant’s favor). 
 19  1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, §3:5, at 437 n.4 (“It is irresistible [to] draw 
an analogy to likelihood or comparative probability: 51-49 (or for that matter 50.001-49.999) 
is enough.”).  
 20  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 266 (quoting FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 34).  Cf. Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) 
(discussing examples of “more likely than not” standard in preliminary factual issues for the 
court).  
 21  See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of 
Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 543–44 (1989); David H. Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 
89 YALE L. J. 601 (1980) (reviewing MICHAEL FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN 
LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO 
LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978)). 
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The Pardo/Allen theory has a great deal going for it.  Juries can seldom 
be certain about the truth.22  Their ability to resolve questions of fact under 
such conditions of uncertainty depends on their selection and application of 
cognitive strategies they have learned from their experience given limited 
availability, time and cognitive resources.  Pennington and Hastie’s work on 
the story model was designed to delineate one such strategy, central to 
understanding discourse, i.e., to the jury’s comprehension and assessment of 
evidence,23 on which the Pardo/Allen theory relies, in part.  Moreover, it is 
undoubtedly true that jurors, who are at least outwardly passive, often rely 
heavily on the parties’ gathering of evidence and formulation of theories, or 
explanations of the evidence.  When jurors have no reason to question the 
adequacy of the evidence or of the hypotheses that the parties have 
constructed to explain the evidence, then it makes perfect sense for jurors to 
compare those hypotheses in the process of reaching their decision. In 
addition, Professors Pardo and Allen make the telling point that more formal 
theories of evidence and inference, in particular Bayes’ Theorem, depend in 
unacknowledged ways on narrative and other accounts of causation.  Finally, 
their emphasis on comparison does not require that the fact finder consider 
all of the evidence that might bear on the ultimate issue.  Exhaustive 
evaluation of evidence is utterly unworkable.24 
Even so, Pardo and Allen’s analysis of the preponderance test seems to 
fall short.  Research on human cognition suggests that successful decision 
makers employ strategies that sometimes call for an assessment of whether 
the information they have on an issue is sufficiently complete to support a 
decision, and to apply the default rule, or seek more information, when the 
data at hand seem insufficient.25  Pardo and Allen’s position bars 
 
 22  I will use “jury,” “juror” or “jurors” to refer to fact finders in general, unless the 
context clearly indicates otherwise.  
 23  See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). 
 24  See Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy:  Conditional Relevancy and 
Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1260–71. 
 25  Indeed, the story model itself posits that fact finders will consider the completeness of 
evidence when asking whether they have enough confidence in the stories they construct to 
support a verdict. Moreover, at least some scholars take the position that inference to the best 
explanation requires that an explanation or hypothesis meet a threshold requirement of 
plausibility (regardless of whether there are plausible competitors) before it can be considered 
“best.”  Laudan, supra note 15, at 304.  Setting aside questions about the adequacy of an 
information base for drawing conclusions, Josephson argues that inference to the best 
explanation (or, as it is sometimes called, abduction) suggest that it must take account of two 
possible explanations even if the parties fail to offer them: (i) that the evidentiary basis is false 
(or just “noise”) and (ii) that some new explanation not yet formulated will be better.  John 
R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, in THE DYNAMICS 
OF LEGAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 287, 293 (Peter Tillers & 
Marilyn MacCrimmon eds. 2002).   
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consideration of the adequacy of evidence to support an explanation, so long 
as one explanation seems to be better than any competitor.  It is also 
inconsistent with any requirement that fact finders consider whether some 
unarticulated explanation might be better.  Accordingly, as a descriptive 
theory, it cannot fit with the extant summary judgment and judgment as a 
matter of law standard, nor, in a real sense, does it seem consistent with the 
requirement of proof by a preponderance. 
The main point of this paper is to show that inference to the best 
explanation provides an inadequate model of the preponderance standard if 
it omits consideration of whether the plaintiff26 has offered sufficient 
evidence and an adequate explanation to justify a finding in its favor, 
regardless of the theories and evidence in defendant’s favor.  Moreover, the 
fact that the explanations in favor of plaintiff are better is necessary, but not 
always sufficient to warrant a verdict in its favor.  In contrast, research on 
human problem solving (in conjunction with inference to the best 
explanation) strongly supports judicial examination of sufficiency of the 
evidence (primarily through motions for summary judgment and judgment 
as a matter of law) and jurors’ consideration of the adequacy of evidence and 
inferences to support a verdict. 
In order to lay the groundwork for that argument, I have to discuss some 
other research on evidence to which it responds, or on which I plan to build 
it.  First is a brief analysis of the utility of statistical evidence and models of 
the process of proof, with particular attention to some descriptive and 
prescriptive weaknesses.  Mathematical models are, at best, normative at 
very high levels of generality.  As a guide to practical decisions, they fail to 
recognize several realities of practical decision making, creating an irrational 
model of rationality.  The paper then summarizes the Pardo/Allen theory, 
which is in fair part an attempt to formulate a theory of the proof process that 
does not have the defects of mathematical models.  Finally, the paper briefly 
sketches a theory of the preponderance of the evidence that is more 
consistent with research on cognition and with the legal significance of the 
burden of persuasion than either mathematical models or Pardo and Allen’s 
theory could be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 26  Again, I use the word “plaintiff” as short hand for the party with the burden of 
persuasion, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.  
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I. ON QUANTIFICATION 
The status of mathematical models of inference from evidence has been 
a persistent issue in evidence scholarship over the last forty years or so.  
Advocates of the use of mathematical models ranged from those who argued 
that jurors should be taught to use statistics in the process of deliberation 
about evidence that witnesses did not quantify,27 to what is probably the 
predominant current view: that the models can be helpful for understanding 
the inferential process, even though judges or jurors do not, and probably 
cannot, use the models to evaluate specific pieces of evidence and their effect 
on the verdict in the time available to them at trial.28  I will summarize the 
reasons for skepticism about mathematical models here, only insofar as 
Pardo and Allen’s work is a response to them—I have addressed 
probabilistic modeling in its own right elsewhere.29 
A surprising amount of the debate crystallized around a set of 
hypotheticals.  The best known is the Blue Bus case, one version of which 
Professor Shaviro offered in the Harvard Law Review:30 plaintiff is hit by a 
bus that she knows is blue but cannot otherwise describe.  She establishes 
that the defendant bus company operates eighty percent of all the blue buses 
in the area.  In the absence of other relevant evidence, this evidence 
establishes an eighty percent chance that the bus company is liable.  No one 
thinks that a similar situation is likely to occur in real life.  For example, it 
seems unlikely that a plaintiff would ever testify that a bus hit her without 
providing details such as the speed of the bus, her own conduct, and so forth.  
The stakes for the academics involved in the debates over the blue bus 
hypothetical were not limited to resolving such cases.  The debates over the 
blue bus example, and related exchanges over models based on Bayes’ 
Theorem, were really about the nature of inference under conditions of 
uncertainty—the context in which almost all trials take place.  Essentially, 
the Bayesian idea was that our inferences from evidence can, and should, 
conform to the principles of statistics, that we can use Bayes’ Theorem to 
 
 27  See Stephen E. Fienberg, & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference 
for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 
771, 792 (1986) (advocates of use of Bayesian model to train jurors). 
 28  E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. 
EVIDENCE & PROOF 276, 289–91 (1997). 
 29  E.g., Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian 
Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L. J. 1 (1982); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the 
Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TUL. L. REV. 457 (1991); Craig R. Callen, Adams and 
the Person in the Locked Room, 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE (1998). 
 30  Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 530, 530–31 (1989).  He drew his hypothetical from Laurence H. Tribe, Trial 
by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1340–41 
(1971).  Tribe adapted it from Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 
(1945).  
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test to guide, assess or represent inferential processes.31  In other words, their 
argument was that the use of models demonstrated rational reasoning under 
conditions of uncertainty (“rational” being a tricky word),32 or, at least, a 
rational method for dealing with uncertainty.33 
Now it seems only human to have a desire to try to calculate the odds 
of guilt after receiving impressive statistical evidence (such as a positive 
DNA test with a very low random match frequency).34  Even so, the premise 
that we can, or should, conform to mathematical probability theory is subject 
to some question.  In that sense, the Blue Bus debates (or, more prosaically, 
questions about the status of mathematical models) raise questions about 
how we should resolve disputes of fact.  And, given that the most common 
expression of the preponderance of evidence standard is “more likely than 
not,” or “more likely so than not so,” the preponderance standard is among 
the likelier targets of mathematical modelers. 
To illustrate the application of Bayes’ Theorem without a lot of 
mathematics, assume the question is whether the defendant was the source 
of blood that bears on the identity of the person who committed a crime.  
Assume that a DNA test indicates that the sample and the defendant’s blood 
yield the same results when subjected to certain probes.  Only 1 in 100 
randomly selected persons’ blood would have those same traits.  The 
frequency of lab error is 5%.  Now, if the juror expressed her pre-DNA 
assessment of the likelihood that defendant committed the crime in 
numerical form, the following chart shows the results of applying Bayes’ 
Theorem. 
 
 31  One expression of Bayes’ Theorem is 
                                 P(B|A) =_____      ________________P(B)* P(A|B)___________ 
                                                              [P(B) * P(A|B)] + [P(not-B) * P(A|not-B)] 
where the probability that A is true is P(A), that A is false is P(not-A), and the probability that 
A is true given that B is true is P(A|B).  See Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some 
Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L. J. 1, 12–14 n. 46 (1982).  
Further, (i) P(B) and P(not-B) must equal 1, (ii) P(A) must equal P(A&B) + P(A & not-B), 
and (iii) P(A&B) must equal P(B) x .P(A|B).  Craig R. Callen, Statistical Methods and a 
Paradox of Forensic Expertise, in FORENSIC EXPERTISE AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 129, 130 
n. 2 (1993).  
 32  See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 
66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 452–53 (1986) (“[T]he law may be Bayesian rational without mandating 
a fact-finding process that combines evidence with conformity with Bayes’s Theorem or its 
underlying axioms.”). 
 33  See Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. 
EVIDENCE & PROOF 276, 278 (1997) (“The conventional [Bayesian] theory is not contrived; 
it reflects rational treatment of uncertainty based on intuitively appealing and experientially 
successful premises.”). 
 34  E.g., 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, §3:5, at 437 n.4 (“It is irresistible [to] 
draw an analogy to likelihood or comparative probability: 51–49 (or for that matter 50.001–
49.999) is enough.”). 
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Probability of Guilt before 
Learning of DNA Test Result 
Probability of Guilt after Learning 
of Test (Rounded) 
0% 64.1% 
25% 84.3 % 
50% 94,2% 
75% 98% 
 
In order to arrive at the probability of guilt without knowing about the 
DNA evidence, one could ask what the likelihood of receiving the other 
evidence would be if the defendant were guilty as compared to the likelihood 
of innocence and set the initial probability of guilt accordingly.35  That is not 
to say that there would be hard data on the probability of guilt based on non-
quantified evidence—it is subjective.  “Application of the conventional 
probability theory to subjective probability assignments is the essence of 
Bayesianism.”36  Professor Shaviro’s version of the hypothetical highlights 
several of the problems with Bayesian models because it is such a stark 
mathematical argument.  First, Professor Shaviro’s view exemplified a 
problem that Professor Tribe earlier called the “dwarfing of soft variables”37 
when he argued that, absent other evidence, the court should direct a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff.38  Even assuming that the Blue Bus Co. operated 
80% of blue buses in the area, there would be reasons to suppose that the 
likelihood of liability would be less than market share—absent further 
information.  Thorough application of mathematical models would require 
discounting for several reasons.  For example, one must discount (i) for 
possible errors in eyewitness identification,39 and (ii) to reflect that the 
hypothetical presents few, if any, facts to show that the bus company 
breached a duty to the plaintiff, or that, if it did so, its breach was the 
proximate cause of the injury—a worrisome failure.40  In short, as Tribe 
suggested might happen, the seeming ease of inference from the market share 
 
 35  See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 247 n. 70; Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion, supra 
note 29, at 4–5.  If the DNA evidence were the first evidence the jury received, one might set 
the prior probability at .5, on the theory that the jurors would not know who had the better 
case.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 372 (2001).  There is a great 
deal more discussion about prior probabilities in the literature, but it is largely beyond the 
scope of this piece.  
 36  Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE 
& PROOF 276, 277 (1997). 
 37  Tribe, supra note 30 at 1361–62.  
 38  Shaviro, supra note 30, at 533.  
 39  See, e.g., Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of “Sufficiency of the 
Evidence” Tests, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (1991).  
 40  POSNER, supra note 35, at 371 n.66; Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of 
Statistical Evidence, supra note 29, at 473.  
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led Shaviro to ignore other portions of the fact finding task that would not be 
so easy to quantify. 
Second, even if Professor Shaviro had developed an equation that 
incorporated the soft variables, we simply do not (and probably cannot) think 
about questions of fact as zealous Bayesians might wish.41  For example, in 
order for human inferences to correspond to subjective probabilities, all of 
our beliefs would have to be consistent, i.e., no contradictions or conflicts 
would be permissible.  All signs are that we do not have the cognitive 
capacity to check all of our beliefs for latent conflicts.  That is not to say that 
we consciously entertain conflicts, such as believing at the same time that 
Bush is president and that Gore is.  But it is to say that, given the vast range 
of experiences we have, the constraints on our decision-making resources,42 
and the unlikelihood that avoiding latent inconsistencies would have a 
significant payoff, there is no reason to suppose that we do, can, or should 
keep our beliefs consistent.43  So there is substantial room for question about 
the usefulness of subjective probability statements, particularly for decision 
making in realistic conditions, i.e., real time. 
Third, mathematical logic of the sort Bayesian models employ is 
reversible.  Suppose one calculates the probability of a conclusion as .67.  
There is nothing in mathematical logic to prevent the calculator from 
concluding that he or she simply applied the mathematical formula 
incorrectly, developing a new equation (or reassigning probabilities) and 
recalculating, until satisfied that the result seems reasonable, and that the 
application of the theorem incorporates the relevant criteria.44 
That is related to the fourth point.  Advocates of the use of subjective 
or personalist probability in conjunction with Bayes’ Theorem might 
criticize the reversibility argument on the ground that it smacks too much of 
manipulating the formula to procure a particular result.  Probabilistic models 
can only guide decisions well to the extent they reflect useful information 
and the appropriate inferential relationships among items of data and the 
 
 41  E.g., Richard O. Lempert, Of Flutes, Oboes and the As If World of Evidence Law, 1 
INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 316, 317 (1997). 
 42  Including time and cognitive capacity.  
 43  Professor Redmayne suggests that, given that we only have a limited number of beliefs 
in play at any time, we may be able to limit checks for consistency to those beliefs.  See Mike 
Redmayne, Rationality, Naturalism and Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 849, 864–65 
(2003).  Unless our beliefs are inherently probabilistic, however, in order for assignments of 
probability to be reliable, they must be consistent with some well-founded beliefs about odds 
formation, which we have tested in a number of other contexts.  Since our everyday cognition 
does not seem to be Bayesian in any comprehensive sense, Redmayne’s suggestion would 
still be intractable. 
 44  Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A 
Clarification of the “Naked Statistical Evidence” Debate, the Meaning of “Evidence,” and 
the Requirement of Proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL L. REV. 1093, 1110 (1991). 
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conclusions to which they may point. 
Nothing in an equation picks out one piece of data rather than another 
as important, or even worth including.  Instead, probabilistic formulae rest 
on our experience, and we may have to adjust the fit of the formulae and the 
experience so that they can work appropriately.  Nor does anything in an 
equation measure whether (i) the variables in the equation exhaust the types 
of information that bear (or reasonably could bear) on the ultimate questions 
or (ii) whether the evidence supporting the result of a probabilistic model is 
as complete as one would expect.  Research suggests that jurors do consider 
completeness of the evidence in resolving questions of fact.45 
Jurors would, indeed, be somewhat irrational if they did not ask 
themselves not only whether the evidence was consistent with the parties’ 
contentions, but also whether the parties’ offers of evidence and hypotheses 
to explain it were consistent with the social import of the issue confronting 
them.  To illustrate, consider a standard explanation for the intuition that the 
facts in the blue bus hypothetical are insufficient to support a verdict: that 
the absence of other evidence suggests that plaintiff did not bother making 
such a search for other evidence.  In such a situation, the statistical 
information should be insufficient.46  If a Bayesian model yielded what 
seemed to be an anomalous result and the decision maker noticed the absence 
of such a consideration from the model, the decision maker could rationally 
choose to reverse the process and reformulate the model.  The key 
consideration would be whether the model and the result seemed to fit the 
decision-making process, not whether the decision maker adhered to the 
model. 
In some ways, debates over the utility of probabilistic models for fact 
finding came to a critical point in an English case, Denis Adams (No.2).47  
There, the Court of Appeal relied on its intuitive view of human decision 
making (which empirical studies largely corroborate) to reject the use of 
comprehensive Bayesian models in jury trials.  An eminent statistician 
testified in a rape trial and, in the process, provided the jury with a 
questionnaire based on one Bayesian model48 of the factual issues posed by 
 
 45  See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23.   
 46  See, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 101, 107–09; Tribe, supra note 30, at 1349–50.  Cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at 
371–72 (making argument at lower ratios).  
 47  R. v Adams (Denis John) (No. 2) [1998] 1 Crim. App. 377.  
 48  The model that Professor Donnelly employed was only one of any number of possible 
models of the fact-finding task.  To illustrate:  the transcript of the judgment reproduces a 
portion of the trial judge’s summing up.  According to the judge, one of the prosecution 
experts, identified only as Mr. Lambert, raised doubts about the questionnaire, on the grounds 
that it did not cover “all the relevant evidence or all that [the jury] might think was relevant.”  
Id. at 381.  The trial judge himself pointed out that the questionnaire did not “include a box” 
in which the jury might take account of “Adams’ own evidence and how he gave it.”  Id. at 
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both quantified and unquantified evidence in Adams’ case,49 and explained 
to them how they might use it to calculate the likelihood of Adams’ guilt. 
Adams was convicted of rape.  The trial judge, the Court of Appeal 
said, had “made it abundantly plain to the jury that if they found the Bayesian 
approach helpful then they were at complete liberty, having had it explained 
to them, to use it in their deliberations.”50  The judgment went on, however, 
to hold that the trial judge should not have admitted the evidence at all.  The 
Adams judgment is emphatic that a trial court should exclude such evidence 
in a case “lacking special features” absent there (or here).51  “[E]xpert 
evidence should not be admitted to induce juries to attach mathematical 
values to probabilities arising from nonscientific evidence adduced at 
trial.”52 
As the Court of Appeal read it, the statistician’s questionnaire omitted 
some evidence and arguments that the jury might have wished to credit, and 
might have included other lines of thought that they would have 
disregarded.53  The victim in Adams had failed to identify the defendant as 
her attacker in an identity parade.  The trial court mentioned that failure in 
summing up the evidence.54  The Court of Appeals noted that jurors might 
well ask themselves about the identification and about the significance of 
Adams’ own evidence,55 another apparent omission from the questionnaire.56 
Fifth, Bayesian models of fact finding are difficult to square the notion 
of proof of elements of a claim by a preponderance of evidence with 
mathematical models.  Suppose a claim has four elements, and the truth of 
each is independent of the others.  Further, suppose that, according to an 
interpretation that is standard for Bayesians57 and many others, a 
 
381–82. 
 49  Id. at 380. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. at 385. 
 52  Adams (Denis John) (No. 2) [1998] 1 Crim. App. at 385.  
 53  It might seem that jurors could ignore the boxes for arguments that they did not 
consider worth their attention.  That argument would conflict with a number of assumptions 
that seem to underlie the defendant’s use of Professor Donnelly.  Arguing that jurors might 
disregard arguments to which Professor Donnelly’s questionnaire referred, and attempt to use 
the questionnaire without relying on them, assumes that the jury has considerable 
sophistication in statistics.  Yet, if the jury has such knowledge, it is not clear why Professor 
Donnelly’s testimony should be admissible.  In addition, jurors who were inclined to defer to 
the expert witness’ knowledge of logic might be very reluctant to set aside lines of thought 
that he suggested.  In any event, jurors who lacked statistical sophistication would have 
difficulty deciding whether they could ignore an item in the questionnaire without conflict 
with the underlying mathematical model.  
 54  Adams (Denis John) (No. 2) [1998] 1 Crim. App. at 382.  
 55  Id. at 384–85.  
 56  Id. at 382. 
 57  Friedman, supra note 28, at 278 (“This, of course, is the familiar ‘more likely than 
CALLEN_FORMATTED.DOCXCALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:50 AM 
1530 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1517 
preponderance is any probability greater than .5.  So, according to 
mathematical theory, plaintiff could show four elements by just more than 
.5, and the probability of their conjunction would be roughly one sixth, or 
.514. 
There are two ways to reconcile that requirement with the 
preponderance standard, each of which is problematic.  One can read the 
preponderance standard to apply only to the conjunction, which means that 
the probability of each element of a two element claim should be more than 
.7 (on average) and of a three element claim, more than .8.  It is difficult to 
see why the number of elements should affect the burden of persuasion for 
each or why the burden should be as high as .7 given the typical instruction.  
Alternatively, one might say that the jury need only believe that a set of 
evidence that shows all of the elements of the claim is more likely than .5 to 
be accurate.  That argument saves, in a sense, mathematical models, but only 
by stipulating that they cannot be used for anything more detailed than a 
global assessment of the evidence.58 
One final argument is important for my discussion of the Pardo/Allen 
theory.  What is called the reference class problem in probabilistic models 
reinforces the importance of experience as a foundation for the application 
of logic.  In the blue bus case above, the class of buses in town may not be 
the most appropriate one for assessing the likelihood of liability.  Instead, it 
may be preferable to ask what percentage of the vehicles that the plaintiff 
would identify as blue buses are owned and operated by the defendant, what 
percentage of vehicles that hit people are owned by the defendant, what 
percentage of the buses on the relevant street are blue, or what percentage of 
vehicles that the plaintiff would identify as blue buses that drive on the 
relevant street are defendant’s.59  Probabilistic logic does not tell us which 
reference class is optimal, or how picky we should be about reference 
classes.  Certainly, as Professors Pardo and Allen have pointed out, if we 
built a probabilistic model that took account of all possibly relevant factors, 
gathered all of the information relating to those factors and sought to 
calculate the probability of liability, and applied that model correctly, the 
result would be a probability of liability of either 1.0 (certainly liable) or 0.0 
 
not,’ or ‘balance of probabilities,’ standard.”).  
 58  One Bayesian has argued that jury instructions tend to be ambiguous on the question 
of whether the plaintiff must prove each element of the claim by a preponderance, or just the 
conjunction of them.  Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a 
Mathematical Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947, 949 (1986).  That 
seems overstated.  He cites as ambiguous an instruction that says, in pertinent part, “If the 
proof should fail to establish any essential element of plaintiff’s claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence in the case, the jury should find for the defendant.”  Id. (quoting E. DEVITT & C. 
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 71.14 (3d ed. 1977)). 
 59  Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models 
of Evidence, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 107, 109 (2007). 
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(certainly not liable).60  Absent that information, Bayesians must confront 
the question of the appropriateness of the reference classes to which their 
models refer.  There is no mathematical way to answer that question. 
That concern is related to a phrase that keeps popping up in cases and 
commentary.  Debates over blue bus hypotheticals often touched on the 
status of “naked”61 or “solely”62 statistical evidence, and whether it is 
sufficient to support a verdict.  Discussions of the question are confusing, 
because the distinction between naked statistics and other sorts of evidence 
is ill-founded.  A “naked” or “sole” statistic would simply be a number, with 
no information about what it quantified, or the context in which one might 
make inferences based on it.  There would be no reason to regard it as 
probative of anything.63  Reluctance to premise a verdict on a statistic such 
 
 60  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 260. [ 
 61  See Kaye, supra note 21. 
 62  See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 545. 
 63  See, e.g., Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 466–69.  To adapt a famous thought 
experiment by Professor John Searle, 
 
Suppose we were to conduct an experiment in which I sat in a 
locked room with a personal computer and an instruction 
manual.  At some point, I received an e-mail message listing 
“G” as a conclusion, and designating four or five other 
variables as evidence.  I then consulted the manual and sent a 
message with a series of questions derived from the instructions 
therein, such as “What is P(A|G)?”.  On receiving a response 
stipulating mathematical values in response to each question, I 
inserted them into a spreadsheet according to the directions in 
the manual, and depressed the enter key.  On reading the result, 
0.563, I then transmitted it as an e-mail message to my 
unknown correspondent.  Would my role (as compared to that 
of, e.g, a person sending me e-mail messages) be fairly 
described as fact-finding or problem-solving?  
 
Craig R. Callen, Adams and the Person in the Locked Room, 1 INT’L COMMENTARY ON 
EVIDENCE: iss. 1, art. 3., at 3–4 (1998).  There seems to be no reasonable argument that my 
response to the formal symbols would constitute fact-finding.  Hence, there is a good deal 
more to fact-finding than formal logic.  Searle originally sought to show that a formal logical 
system cannot accurately duplicate human thought.  Searle took the position that digital 
computers cannot understand what they are doing solely on the basis of computer programs, 
because complying with formal procedures does not constitute thought.  Instead it is merely 
a matter of manipulating meaningless symbols without semantic content.  JOHN SEARLE, 
MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE 36 (1984).  He later refined that point, arguing that a computer 
running a program would not thereby be intelligent because the computer would be incapable 
of interpreting its own operations to refer to the world.  JOHN R. SEARLE, THE MYSTERY OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 14–15 (1997).  For a similar argument, see TERRENCE W. DEACON, THE 
SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN 444–45 (1997).  If 
the person sending me email messages were instead to refer, for example, to the likelihood 
that the defendant’s bus negligently struck the plaintiff, instead of P(N), then I would have 
some degree of awareness of the possible application of my work.  Even then I could hardly 
be said to have done the fact-finding, since I could not seek or exclude evidence to which the 
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as the percentage of blue buses in town has less to do with whether the 
evidence is naked than it has to do with questions such as (i) whether the 
statistic refers to the correct reference class, since blue busses might not be 
uniformly distributed through the area,64 (ii) whether reliance on statistical 
evidence would promote or hinder the purposes of the substantive law,65 and 
(iii) whether such reliance would give other plaintiffs incentives to refrain 
from further investigation or submission of evidence.66  Some courts have 
thought that they confronted the issue of whether they should permit a verdict 
based on “naked” statistical evidence, but they had a great deal more 
information than a single, solitary number.  Generally the question in such 
cases was whether, when the evidence would not be sufficient to support a 
verdict without the statistical probability evidence, the evidence would be 
sufficient if the statistical information were added.67  One of the issues likely 
to arise in any such situation is whether the proponent of the evidence 
established an adequate factual foundation for it, which is closely related to, 
if not the same as, the reference class issue. 
II. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 
A. Everyday Life and Sherlock Holmes 
In response to the flaws in mathematical models, particularly as they 
relate to jury decision making in practice, Professors Pardo and Allen sought 
to offer an alternative grounded in a better description of fact finders’ 
decision making processes at trial. The Pardo/Allen theory focuses on 
inference to the best explanation.  Inference to the best explanation is not an 
uncommon process, although few of us who use it think of it in those terms.68  
So I will digress slightly to offer a few illustrations of it. 
At my gym one night, I was walking past a man who was talking loudly 
into a cell phone and said “Four foot long turkey and three foot long ham.  
I’m on my way.”  The first idea (technically a hypothesis or explanation) that 
popped into my head was that the man was discussing a topic that related to 
some very large farm products.  I quickly realized that there was another 
 
instructions referred.  In other words, at best, mathematical models of reasoning under 
uncertainty rely heavily on the decision maker’s use of her experience to identify, organize, 
and assess relevant evidence.  That ability is not itself mathematical, and reliance on it may, 
in some senses, render the statistical results at best, a summary of underlying inferences rather 
than a guide for inference.  
 64  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 260 & n. 121. 
 65  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 260 & n. 121. 
 66  See, e.g., Hart v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 60 Fed. Cl. 598, 607 (2004).  
See Callen, Adjudication, supra note 33, at 497–98.  
 67  E.g., Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone Co., 966 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Mo. 1996). 
 68  See generally Harman, supra note 14. 
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possible explanation: that he was on his way to pick up four foot long turkey, 
and three foot-long ham, sandwiches.  My recall of an additional piece of 
information, that Jimmy John’s Sandwiches was around the corner, seemed 
to strengthen that hypothesis.  Moreover, had he been on his way to pick up 
a four foot long turkey, he would probably have said “a four foot long 
turkey,” or in the case of the ham “a three foot long ham.”  Taking a more 
whimsical view, given that everyone was getting pretty tired of the Super 
Tuesday stories in the media, a four foot long turkey or a three foot long ham 
would probably have been the lead story on the local television news, and I 
had seen no such story.69 
In effect, I used inference to the best explanation, in that I started with 
some pieces of information, generated some explanations from it, assessed 
the quality of those explanations, chose the best one, and accepted it for my 
purposes.  In the process, I unconsciously searched my memory for other 
information relating to the hypothesis, in this case, information about the 
location of a sandwich shop, grammar, and the typical size of farm animals.70 
While Pardo and Allen do not mention it (and may not be too fond of 
Holmes),71 inference to the best explanation has a relatively unique 
distinction among theories of inference: a relatively standard fictional source 
of illustrations, Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes.  Citations to 
Holmes seem to be fairly common in academic scholarship on the relation 
of inference to the best explanation to fact finding and investigation.72  
Criminologists use the fictional Holmes’ methods, and may acknowledge 
him as a source of ideas and useful techniques.73  Charles Peirce originated 
the concept of abduction, which is closely related, if not identical, to 
inference to the best explanation.74  Professor David Schum noted Peirce was 
 
 69  There were other alternatives, including the possibility that he was seeking to obtain 
the services of bad child actors, selected by size. 
 70  See Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, supra note 14, at 89.  
 71  For fairly strong criticism of the Holmes stories’ depiction of circumstances in which 
he “probably should be wrong and he isn’t,” see, for example,  D. Michael Risinger, Boxes in 
Boxes: Julian Barnes, Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes and the Edalji Case, 4 INT’L 
COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE iss. 2, art. 3, at 13 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol4/iss
2/art3/; Richard Posner, CSI:  Baker Street, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2004), http://www.t
nr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20041011&s=posner101104. 
 72  See, e.g., David A Schum, Species of Abductive Reasoning in Fact Investigation in 
Law, in THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROOF:  COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 307, 
314 (Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., 2003); Thomas A. Sebeok & Jean Umiker-
Sebeok, “You Know My Method”: A Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes, 
in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 11 (Umberto Eco & Thomas A. Sebeok, eds., 
1983). 
 73  Marcello Truzzi, Sherlock Holmes: Applied Social Psychologist, in THE SIGN OF 
THREE, supra note 72, at 55, 57–58. 
 74  Peirce is often credited as the originator of abduction.  “Abductive inference is widely 
taken to be the same as inference to the best explanation.”  DOUGLAS WALTON, ABDUCTIVE 
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writing at the same time that Conan Doyle wrote the Holmes stories.  Schum 
observed that Holmes’ “investigative strategies seem almost identical to the 
concept of abductive reasoning described by Peirce.”  Nevertheless, “there 
is no evidence that Peirce and Conan Doyle ever shared ideas on the 
subject.”75  Illustrations from Conan Doyle may be more dramatic than 
typical abduction is, and, indeed, Holmes was not too critical of his own 
hypotheses.  Even so, as illustrations of the importance of explanations, they 
work pretty well. 
One of Conan Doyle’s shorter stories illustrates a typical characteristic 
of hypotheses that compete to be the best explanation—they are usually 
causal.  Conan Doyle76 wrote a story entitled How Watson Learned the Trick, 
which was prepared as a miniature book for the Queen’s doll house’s 
library.77  In that story, Sherlock Holmes’ companion, Dr. Watson, sought to 
demonstrate his mastery of Holmes’ “trick,” the ability to draw correct 
conclusions from seemingly inconsequential matters.  He announced his 
conclusion that Holmes was preoccupied upon arising that morning, based 
on Watson’s observation that Holmes was unshaven.  Further, Watson 
inferred that Holmes had been unsuccessful in an investigation for a client 
named Barlow, based on the fact that Watson saw Holmes open an envelope 
with the name Barlow on it and groan.  Watson also believed that Holmes 
had taken up financial speculation because he turned to the financial section 
and uttered an exclamation of interest.  Finally, Watson concluded that 
Holmes expected an important visitor momentarily because Holmes was 
wearing his coat rather than a dressing gown. 
Although Holmes applauded Watson’s initiative, he told Watson that 
he did not yet have the trick.  Holmes was wearing his coat in anticipation of 
his forthcoming visit to his dentist, Barlow, whose letter had just confirmed 
the time for Holmes’ appointment, resulting in the groan.  The financial page 
was next to the cricket scores, and Holmes was interested in Surrey’s 
outcome against Kent.  Finally, Holmes was unshaven because he sent his 
razor out to be sharpened.78  Each part of each explanation rested on a causal 
link, in that it suggested a cause for the evidence. 
Watson, of course, was the character Conan Doyle used as Holmes’ 
foil, and it would not have done for Watson to master Holmes’ method, even 
 
REASONING 34 (2004).  
 75  Schum, supra note 72, at 314.  
 76  Umberto Eco has done a good deal of work on abduction (which many theorists regard 
as another name for inference to the best explanation, and vice versa).  He cites Holmes as an 
exemplar of abduction.  Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three 
Types of Abduction, in THE SIGN OF THREE, supra note 72, at 198, 215–20.  
 77  ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, How Watson Learned the Trick, in THE RETURN OF 
SHERLOCK HOLMES 324 (Richard L. Green ed., 1993). 
 78  Id. at 325–26. 
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though Doyle referred to that method as nothing but “systematized common 
sense.”79  The story does, however, depict the use of explanations to assess 
evidence and draw conclusions from it, along with an implicit suggestion 
that the method is not infallible. 
Another Holmes story suggests that an explanation may, in fact, show 
that some characteristics of a situation may be probative when we might, if 
we failed to formulate the explanation, consider those aspects of no 
inferential value.  In Doyle’s story, The Silver Blaze, Holmes solves a 
mystery, in large part, because a possible explanation suggested that 
evidence might be relevant.  In that story, Holmes was trying to determine 
how a racehorse had disappeared.  He surmised that the disappearance might 
have been part of a plot to prevent the horse from winning a race, by making 
a slight cut in the horse’s tendon.  Assuming that someone as careful as the 
perpetrator would not undertake the operation without practice, he asked 
whether some nearby sheep were in good condition, found out that they had 
become lame without any particular reason, and regarded that as 
confirmation of his hypothesis.80 
On its face, the condition of the sheep would have little bearing on the 
horse snatching.  If, however, Holmes had in mind a possible theory about 
the perpetrator’s motive, then the sheep’s condition would become relevant.  
It is important to note here, by the way, that the point of these illustrations is 
not to argue or even suggest that jurors always, or often, engage in processes 
as dramatic or as risky as Holmes’.  Nor, when jurors are considering 
explanations as surprising as Holmes’ often are, should they probe them as 
little as Holmes seems to do.  As Umberto Eco pointed out, detectives can 
afford to take more chances in abduction than scientists can,81 and given their 
relative roles, jurors as the final authority must exercise more caution than 
detectives.  “The greatest weakness in Holmes’ applications of inference—
at least as Watson related them to us—was Holmes’ failure to test the 
hypotheses which he obtained through abduction.”82  On the other hand, 
however, jurors do routinely evaluate the quality of the explanations or 
stories83 that the parties advance for the evidence, and it is their job (as it was 
not Watson’s) to analyze the stories critically. 
 
 79  ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Blanched Soldier, in THE CASE-BOOK OF SHERLOCK 
HOLMES 151, 169 (W.W. Robson, ed. 1993). 
 80  ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, 3, 23, 
28 (Christopher Roden ed. 1993).  
 81  Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Abduction, 
in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 198, 220 (Umberto Eco & Thomas A. Sebeok 
eds., 1983). 
 82  Marcello Truzzi, Sherlock Holmes: Applied Social Psychologist in THE SIGN OF 
THREE, supra note 72, at 55, 70. 
 83  Or theories, or hypotheses. 
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B. Inference to the Best Explanation in the Pardo/Allen Theory 
1. Professors Pardo and Allen on the Basics of Inference to the 
Best Explanation 
Pardo and Allen contended that attention to what they refer to as 
“explanatory considerations” would “provide a better account of micro-level 
proof issues regarding the relevance and probative value of evidence . . . 
which justifies the open ended nature” of rules such as Federal Rules 401 
and 403.84  The Pardo/Allen theory, they say, offers an alternative protocol 
for inferences from the evidence that may, in turn, produce conclusions that 
are better justified than those that mathematical models may yield.85  Further, 
they argued that explanatory considerations afford a better view of standards 
of proof such as the preponderance test than conventional theory does, and 
concomitantly, a better justification for various sorts of motions that allow 
the court to rule against the party with the burden of proof when evidence is 
insufficient or fails to support a verdict adequately.86 
Explanations, they say, are prior to inference from evidence, and also 
help to direct it, in the sense that explanations help to assess the likelihood 
of particular hypotheses or conclusions.  Pardo and Allen depict the process 
of inference to the best explanation as involving two steps: first, generation 
of hypotheses or explanations and, second, selection of the best explanation 
from among the potential hypotheses.  When it comes to formulation the 
“domain of the inferential task,” which probably means our knowledge and 
experience with the subject matter of the questions at hand, will help us 
formulate explanations of data and, at the same time, constrain us from 
relying too much on sheer imagination.87  In legal disputes, the substantive 
law requires that the parties address certain facts, and successful 
explanations must pertain to one or more of those facts.  As Pardo and Allen 
see it, the only limits on the generation of hypotheses that address those 
critical facts are the limits of the creativity of the parties, the court, and the 
jurors.88 
The second phase of inference to the best explanation, in the authors’ 
eyes, involves a comparison of explanations and choice of the best one.  They 
cite criteria for choice such as the extent to which a hypothesis (i) is simple; 
 
 84  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225–26.  
 85  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225.  
 86  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 226.  
 87  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229.  As they point out, explanations that serve for a 
chemist will not serve for a musical composer, so that acceptability of hypotheses may be a 
function of the decision maker’s cognitive interest.  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229–30.  
Non-law disciplines are not of much interest here, although the jurors’ cognitive interest does 
have some importance.   
 88  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 230.  
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(ii) accounts for numerous and diverse pieces of evidence; (iii) fits with our 
general knowledge, or “background beliefs;” and (iv) is systematic rather 
than makeshift.89  That measure of the quality of an explanation is contested.  
For example, one philosopher sets a higher bar: as a threshold for acceptance 
as the best account of the facts, a hypothesis must (i) “explain . . . different 
kinds of facts; (ii) possess “simplicity” (a quality inversely related to “the 
number and nature” of the assumptions on which the hypothesis’s 
explanatory power depends); (iii) exhibit analogies with other explanations 
known to be successful and (iv) “strongly cohere” with more basic or 
“background” beliefs.90 
Pardo and Allen argue that decision-makers who are choosing among 
explanations will choose the hypothesis that best explains the aspects of 
evidence that are most of interest to them.  So, for example, if we are 
considering the explanation “the butler did it,” that is helpful if we wonder 
who committed a murder, but much less useful as an explanation if the 
question is whether the dining room silver was laid out in a precise pattern.91  
Finally, in explaining the force of explanations, they note that there is 
something of a circularity.  As they conceive of explanations, an explanation 
can help us to understand facts, and yet the facts also tend to make the 
explanation seem more accurate.  They argue that the circularity “is not 
vicious or problematic” but merely an accurate description of human 
inferential practice.92 
2. Inference to the Best Explanation and Sufficiency of 
Evidence 
Turning to trials, they argue that the parties are primarily responsible 
for generating theories or hypotheses to explain the evidence.  Those with 
the burden of persuasion must address all of the elements of the claim or 
defense; their opponents may address fewer since a verdict in their favor on 
one will defeat their opponent.  Parties may offer alternative explanations, 
and triers of fact may develop explanations of their own.93  Once the 
hypotheses are formulated, Pardo and Allen believe that the triers of fact 
 
 89  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 230.  
 90  Laudan, supra note 15, at 294 (2007) (discussing the views of Paul Thagard).  In his 
seminal article on inference to the best explanation, after mentioning most of the 
considerations that the authors list, Professor Harman wrote, “I do not wish to deny that there 
is a problem about explaining the exact nature of these considerations; I will not, however, 
say anything more about this problem.”  
 91  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 232–33.  
 92  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 233.  It is not clear how this circularity is consistent 
with the ability of the fact finder to evolve theories on his or her own.   
 93  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234.  In addition, see the discussion of St. Mary’s, 
infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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choose the most plausible,94 accepting it as accurate and finding in favor of 
the party that the explanation supports.  They rely on the work of Pennington 
and Hastie, which argues that jurors reach their conclusions through the 
construction and assessment of stories in terms of criteria such as internal 
consistency, completeness, and uniqueness.95  Once again, in determining 
the extent of detail necessary for hypotheses and the facts that they should 
explain, the substantive law and the contentions of the parties will determine 
the contours that a hypothesis must map in order to be helpful.  Where stories 
differ in terms of details that do not matter or at least are not critical, Pardo 
and Allen argue that triers of fact may aggregate the stories in order to assess 
the likelihood of critical facts.96 
Sometimes, however, development of a good theory may be more 
difficult.  Noting that cases may occur in which “neither party offers a 
particularly plausible explanation of the evidence, either because neither side 
can explain key pieces of evidence or because there is such a paucity of 
evidence that it can be explained in multifarious ways,” none of which is 
better, or more likely, than its rivals.97  According to the authors, the 
comparative aspect of their theory requires a verdict in the first case (where 
no explanation offered or constructed is particularly plausible) unless no 
explanation is of better quality than the others.98  If the explanations are all 
of the equivalent quality, then the party with the burden of persuasion would 
fail to meet it.  If the evidence was so thin that it did not permit the trier to 
distinguish among explanations, the party with the burden of persuasion 
would, once again, have failed.99  As the authors note, summary judgments 
and judgments as a matter of law are among the means of enforcing the 
 
 94  The authors probably mean to use “most plausible” as the equivalent of “best,” 
although they do not specify the significance of plausibility.  Some writers on abduction 
consider plausibility a tricky concept.  See Appendix B:  Plausibility, in ABDUCTIVE 
INFERENCE: COMPUTATION, PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY 266–67 (John R. Josephson & Susan 
G. Josephson eds., 1996).  I do not understand Pardo and Allen to be staking out a position in 
that debate.  
 95  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234 & n. 35.  In discussing uniqueness, Pennington 
and Hastie say that the availability of multiple explanations for the evidence will weaken 
belief in one over the others.  On the other hand, if there is only one story that satisfies the 
criteria of consistency, completeness, and uniqueness, jurors will tend to use it in reaching 
their decision.  See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Model of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 528–29 (1991). 
 96  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 235–37.  The Pardo/Allen theory would also 
accommodate aggregation of alternative defenses, such as “I didn’t do it.  But if I did, it was 
in self-defense.  And if it wasn’t in self-defense, I was coerced to do it.”  Pardo & Allen, supra 
note 3, at 256.  Authors devote little attention to that possibility since they doubt that 
defendants are likely to use such an approach.  
 97  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38.  
 98  That assumes, of course, that at least one of the explanations of equivalent quality 
favors each party. 
 99  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 238. 
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burdens of proof—in particular the burden of production.100 
Having looked at the process of proof in civil cases (and in other 
situations not relevant here) Pardo and Allen turn briefly to the relationship 
of the Pardo/Allen theory to rules of evidence, revisiting their somewhat 
circular theory of the relationship between evidence and explanation (that 
explanations explain evidence, which, in turn, makes the explanations seem 
more accurate).  Relevant evidence, they say, is evidence that the offering 
party’s explanation explains (assuming that the explanation bears on a fact 
that the substantive law considers important).  Probative value, they argue, 
is the extent to which an explanation explains the available evidence.101 
3. Objections to the Pardo/Allen Theory 
After they set out the degree to which they believe their conception of 
inference to the best explanation is reflected in fact-finding, Pardo and Allen 
turn to possible objections to it.  One such objection102 is that the choice of 
an explanation as “best” is too subjective.  They argue that criteria such as 
the degree to which the hypothesis explains the evidence are objective and 
that the prevalence of inference to the best explanation in problem-solving 
suggests that such practices have been successful over time and in a number 
of contexts.103 
Pardo and Allen freely concede that there is no guarantee that the 
explanation that the Pardo/Allen theory requires the decision maker to select 
as the best is, in fact, true.  If an argument in deductive logic is valid, and the 
premises of that argument are true, the conclusion must be.104  But fact-
finding at trial seldom turns on deductive arguments.  Instead, reasoning at 
trial almost always involves premises that, even if true, do not guarantee the 
truth of the conclusion to which they lead.  So, for example, a juror might 
believe that it is difficult to see a traffic light suspended over an intersection 
if the sun is setting behind it, and a witness might testify that she saw a red 
light even though she was facing into the setting sun, but that would not 
 
 100  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 238 n.42. 
 101  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 241–42. 
 102  I will not recapitulate objections from the philosophy of science, which do not seem 
to have much bearing on the preponderance standard. 
 103  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 23. 
 104  Of course, if the premises of a deductive argument are wrong, then the conclusion may 
be as well.  For example, the following deductive argument is perfectly valid, yet its 
conclusion is inaccurate:  
 
The sky is green.  
All things that are green are on Mars. Therefore, the sky is on Mars.  
 
See, e.g., WILLARD V. O. QUINE, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 50–52 (1970); Craig R. Callen, Notes 
on a Grand Illusion, supra note 29, at 4–5 & n. 21. 
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necessarily require the conclusion that she did not see the light.  On the other 
hand, if the juror concluded that the witness was accurate, and if the 
applicable law held that the motorist was negligent for driving ahead despite 
the red light, the deduction would require the conclusion that the driver was 
negligent.105  Their point is that, if we cannot rely exclusively on deductive 
logic to guide fact-finding, we must accept the possibility that our 
conclusions will be in error.  The Pardo/Allen theory, they contend, is no 
greater potential source of error than any other logic that is inductive, that is, 
that seeks to guide inferences from the evidence that is inconclusive.106 
Readers familiar with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on scientific 
evidence, among others, will recall the stress that the philosopher Karl 
Popper, on whom the Court relied in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,107 put on testing as a justification for inference.  Pardo and 
Allen take the position that the parties test explanations of evidence through 
cross-examination and submission of rebuttal evidence.108  Further, if the 
defendant109 fails to adequately oppose a hypothesis in favor of the plaintiff, 
the authors point out that the jury may still find for defendant if the evidence 
is such that there is no reason to choose plaintiff’s hypothesis over theories 
favoring the defendant.  They view that result as implicit in the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof.110 
Given the controversy over the use of mathematical models in 
evidence, Pardo and Allen address some likely objections from probability 
theory.  Fact finders rarely, if ever, apply comprehensive Bayesian models, 
so controversy between advocates of quantitative models and advocates of 
alternative approaches tend to focus on whether the quantitative models can 
demonstrate the behavior of ideal fact finders, or whether they have 
normative implications for fact-finding or the law of evidence.111  Ideal fact 
finders, or whether they have normative implications for fact finding or the 
 
 105  See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 227, 246.  
 106  See GILBERT HARMAN, THOUGHT 164–68 (1973).  
 107  509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 108  It seems very likely that Pardo and Allen meant this term to include opposing evidence 
that is offered in a case-in-chief rather than confining it to rebuttal examination.  
 109  Shorthand here for the party that bears neither burden of persuasion nor production.  
 110  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 246–47.  For a reason that is not clear, Pardo and Allen 
say that the jury should find for defendant when the plaintiff’s hypothesis seems better than 
the one defendant offered, but no more persuasive than others that favor the defendant, 
because the plaintiff has the obligation to produce “sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could differentiate among the potential contrasting explanations.”  
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 246–47 (emphasis added).  That is almost certainly a 
misstatement.  Setting aside occasional baroque attempts to instruct on civil presumptions, 
jurors do not enforce the burden of production as such, and a failure to offer sufficient 
evidence would normally be addressed by a judgment as a matter of law or cognate motion.  
 111  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 248.  
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law of evidence.112 
One set of objections concerns the question of aggregation since it is in 
theory possible to formulate an infinite set of stories favoring one party or 
the other.  If one must select the best story, some Bayesians argue, any given 
story may be little if any more likely than its closely related colleagues, while 
a mathematical model can arithmetically combine the probabilities of all 
stories that favor a particular viewpoint, and then conduct a comparison.113  
Pardo and Allen point out, however, that substantive law and the actual 
conflicts between the parties at trial help fact finders to identify differences 
among stories that they can ignore for purposes of aggregation.  If, for 
example, one witness testifies that the plaintiff was wearing black on a dark 
night, and another midnight blue, the difference would seldom matter if the 
defendant could only be negligent if he could have seen the plaintiff.  
Accordingly, each of those accounts would weigh in favor of the defendant, 
since the black/midnight blue conflict would be both factually and legally 
unimportant.114  Moreover, they point out that the Bayesian approach is 
dependent on “explanatory considerations” because such considerations 
guide the identification of circumstances that may bear on fact-finding, and 
thus the choice of data that are to be included in a mathematical model.115 
Professor Allen is one of the main champions of the conjunction 
paradox argument116 against the Bayesian theory, so it follows that they 
believe that the Pardo/Allen theory avoids the paradox.  Under the Pardo/
Allen theory, once the fact finders have selected the best explanation of the 
evidence, that explanation either includes and confirms the elements of a 
claim or defense, or it does not.  If it does confirm (or “instantiate”) the 
elements, then the party bearing the burden of persuasion wins, otherwise, it 
loses.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 112  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 248.  
 113  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 254–61 (discussing Richard D. Friedman, “E” is for 
Eclectic:” Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 2029 (2001)); Richard D. 
Friedman, Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesianism, Hearsay and 
Other Evidence, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 79 (1992); Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology 
and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551 (2001). 
 114  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 229–30.  
 115  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 253.  
 116  E.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 407 
(1986).   
 117  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 231–34.  
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Bayesian theory, they argue, requires that the court be aware of all 
possible explanations for the evidence so that the probability of the 
explanations will add up to 1.0.118  Pardo and Allen point out that parties at 
trial behave otherwise, often seizing on the best explanation in their favor, 
possibly due to the fear that proffering a large number of explanations would 
suggest to the fact finder that none of them had support.  They argue that 
“the standard problem” for trials is not the difficulty of accumulating and 
aggregating all of the stories favoring the parties.  Instead, they think that 
resolving cases in which one would quantify the probability of the 
plaintiff’s119 story as less than .5, but substantially greater than the 
probability of the defendant’s.  To use their example, suppose that the 
probability of the plaintiff’s case is .4 and the defendant has two defenses, 
which each have a probability of .1.  A Bayesian approach, they argue, would 
require a defense verdict, because the probability of plaintiff’s case would 
not exceed .5.  As they conceive of it, the Pardo/Allen theory requires that 
the plaintiff win, because plaintiff’s explanation would be the best.120 
4. Pardo and Allen on the Implications of the Pardo/Allen 
Theory 
Pardo and Allen contend that clarifies standards of persuasion because 
(i) it is a better description of trial processes than probabilistic models are, 
(ii) is consistent with the best current research on jury processes, (iii) does 
not produce the conjunction paradox “and [iv] allows the standards to fulfill 
their function of distributing errors among the parties.”121 
In light of jurors’ use of inference to the best explanation, they believe 
that procedures for testing the sufficiency of evidence such as summary 
judgment or directed verdict are vital.  Assuming that the moving party does 
not have the burden of persuasion, such motions pose the question of whether 
there is sufficient evidence to allow the jury reasonably to infer that the 
 
 118  I am not sure what Professors Pardo and Allen mean in this regard.  In their favor, 
Bayesian models typically assume that P(A) and P(not-A) sum to 1.0. On the other hand, 
given constraints of time and cognitive resources, it seems doubtful that any advocate of 
Bayesian models is likely to argue that the probability of all of the explanations that jurors 
must consider must sum to 1.0. 
 119  Assuming that the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff. 
 120  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256–57.  After that point, Pardo and Allen argue that 
the Pardo/Allen theory gives a better account of probative value than does a Bayesian model, 
relying on their analysis of an illustration from Kahneman and Tversky.  Pardo & Allen, supra 
note 3, at 257–61.  It is an interesting point but does not seem to have any implications for the 
burden of persuasion that the remainder of their argument does not suggest.  On Kahneman 
and Tversky’s research program in general, see, for example, Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal 
Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY:  THE ADAPTIVE 
TOOLBOX 51, 52–55 (2001).  
 121  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 261–62.  
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aggregate explanation in favor of the non-moving party could be the better 
explanation.122  To put the summary judgment standard in Pardo and Allen’s 
terms “a judge ought to grant such a motion only if a jury would have to find 
one side’s explanation more plausible than the other side’s explanation.”123 
With respect to Pardo and Allen’s interpretation of the preponderance 
test, the authors accept that “[w]hen you have considered all the evidence in 
the case, you must be persuaded that it is more probably true than not true,” 
as correct in theory.124  They note, however, that jurors seldom receive 
further guidance about the preponderance test.  Jurors, they believe, compare 
explanations in fact-finding.  In that light, Professors Pardo and Allen hold 
that the courts should clarify civil jurors’ task by telling them “to select the 
best explanation of the evidence (or the most plausible version of the litigated 
events) and that something has been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence if it is part of their selected explanation or version of events.”125 
IV. RESEARCH ON PROBLEM-SOLVING, THE STORY MODEL AND 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF ABDUCTION AS SOURCES OF 
DESCRIPTION 
Professors Pardo and Allen argued that their theory reflects jurors’ 
actual decision-making much more than probability-based accounts do.126  
Not surprisingly, they believe that it has significant explanatory and 
normative implications as well.127  There is significant agreement (although 
hardly unanimity) that jurors do not behave as decision-makers following a 
comprehensive Bayesian model would.  The Pardo/Allen theory seems to be 
a better description of jury behavior, if only because it takes as an implicit 
premise that jurors can make good decisions without hearing and assessing 
all possibly relevant evidence or all conceivable explanations. 
 
 122  Or, the only plausible explanation if the non-moving party is the prosecution in a 
criminal case.  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 262–63.  Pardo and Allen’s text refers to 
“devices like summary judgment” as testing the sufficiency of “the explanation that the 
moving party has provided.”  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 262–63.  That must be a mistake 
because summary judgment and analogous motions test the adequacy of the nonmoving 
party’s evidence, and jurors can consider explanations that they formulate, in the aggregate 
with whatever the non-moving party may offer.  Moreover, if summary judgment focused on 
the moving party’s explanation and the non-moving party did not bear the burden of 
persuasion, all that party would have to show to avoid summary judgment is that a reasonable 
jury might conclude that the moving party’s aggregate story was no better than the non-
moving party’s. 
 123  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 265–66.  
 124  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 266, (quoting FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 34). 
 125  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 267.  
 126  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225–26.  See generally, Ronald J. Allen, The Nature 
of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 413–20 (1991).  
 127  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at at 239–46.  
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The Pardo/Allen theory seeks to describe jurors’ behavior primarily in 
terms of a philosophical theory of reasoning under uncertainty—inference to 
the best explanation.  That is not, however, to argue for a rigid distinction 
between philosophy and empirical research.  Indeed, when analyzing 
reasoning under conditions of uncertainty, it is impossible to draw clean 
distinctions among the roles of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology 
and other social sciences.128  My suggestion, indeed, is that analysis of the 
preponderance standard needs a heavier measure of the teachings of 
empirical research on problem-solving than the Pardo/Allen theory includes.  
Reconsidering the Pardo/Allen theory in light of that research leads to a 
somewhat different view of the preponderance standard, and of the 
justification for enforcement of sufficiency of the evidence standards 
through summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law. 
Professor Harman, who first advanced the concept of inference to the 
best explanation, later likened it to the practical reasoning process of 
“satisficing,” rather than maximizing or optimizing.129  “Satisficing” is the 
term for choosing “an alternative that meets or exceeds specified criteria” 
when “it is impossible to optimize, or where the computational cost of doing 
so seems burdensome.”130  Constraints on jurors’ time, knowledge, access to 
evidence and cognitive capacities mean that jurors (or the legal system itself) 
can only satisfice in the resolution of issues of fact—they cannot hold out for 
perfection.  That is not to say that if they can achieve improvement, or even 
seeming perfection, without wasting cognitive resources, they should not do 
so.  Whenever the benefit of expending resources outweighs their costs—
including opportunity costs—the fact finder should expend them.  That may 
include formulating stories of their own.  At the same time, however, when 
there is nothing they can do to increase the comprehensiveness of the 
evidence or explanations they can consider, jurors’ experience as decision 
makers in everyday life may suggest to them that they lack information that 
they should have before taking a particular action, i.e., entering a particular 
verdict. 
The discussion in this section will begin with a discussion of constraints 
on decision-making resources, and the cognitive strategies and default rules 
that we use to make good decisions despite those constraints.  Professors 
Pennington and Hastie developed the story model some years ago.  Their 
research concluded that jurors use stories or narratives as strategies for 
 
 128  See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds. 1982); NICHOLAS RESCHER, COGNITIVE 
ECONOMY:  THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1989); PAUL 
THAGARD, COMPUTATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1988). 
 129  GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 68 (1986). 
 130  See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: EMPIRICALLY 
GROUNDED ECONOMIC REASON 295 (1997). 
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organizing, understanding, and assessment of evidence, despite cognitive 
constraints.  Pennington and Hastie’s research on that use of stories, which 
Pardo and Allen suggest serve the function of explanations in the Pardo/
Allen theory,131 suggests that the Pardo/Allen theory’s view of the 
preponderance test may place excessive constraints on both judges and 
jurors.  Moreover, some research on inference to the best explanation 
suggests that the Pardo/Allen theory focuses too narrowly on specific 
alternative explanations at the expense of the possibility that fact finders may 
regard the explanations or evidence on offer as insufficient to support a 
judgment as serious as the one they are asked to make. 
A. Stories, Cognition, and Confidence in Judgment 
We use what one might call cognitive strategies to organize and 
evaluate information that bears our decisions, in order to make good 
judgments in light of the constraints on human memory and the limitations 
on the time and material resources that we can devote to various issues.132  
Research on cognition developed a theoretical construct called a schema.  
Schemata depict the organization of knowledge in memory.133  When we 
receive new information, schemata help us understand it by reflecting our 
 
 131  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 225 n.3, 235 n.35.  
 132  For example, chess players’ advantage over relative novices lies in their ability to 
isolate critical aspects of a position, rather than in some superhuman extension of mental 
capacity.  E.g., Herbert A. Simon & William G. Chase, Perception in Chess, in 1 MODELS OF 
THOUGHT, 386, 386–87, 402 (Herbert A. Simon ed. 1979).  Chess masters even seem to 
organize their memory for the position of the pieces in ways that reflect actual gameplay, 
resulting in improved memory of actual positions.  Herbert A. Simon & Michael Barenfeld, 
Information Processing Analysis of Perceptual Processes in Problem Solving, in 1 MODELS 
OF THOUGHT at 371.  Even Deep Blue, the extremely powerful chess computer that defeated 
Kasparov could not have been victorious if programmers had not written strategies in its 
program to limit the number of possible outcomes, i.e., the amount of evidence, it would 
evaluate before making a move.  DANIEL HILLIS, THE PATTERN ON THE STONE: THE SIMPLE 
IDEAS THAT MAKE COMPUTERS WORK 83–87 (1998).  Conversely, human players may rely 
on computers to their detriment.  In particular, a player who has memorized a set of computer-
generated moves can find his position suddenly falling apart because he does not understand 
the principles that motivated the moves. 
          Where problems are more complex, strategies are even more important, and brute 
processing power may be of relatively little help.  For example, in the game of Go, “humans 
still reign,” because there are so many more possible positions in a game of Go.  HILLIS at 87.  
The number of possible positions in Go after two move-and-response cycles is more than 16 
times the number of possible positions in chess after three such cycles.  See Callen, supra 
note 24, at 1265 n. 108.  Human Go masters’ cognitive strategies allow them to find good 
moves in limited time despite constraints on their cognitive resources, without assessing all 
of the possible moves.  Supercomputers programmed with simple search strategies such as 
the ones that Deep Blue employed have not been victorious at Go, despite their vast 
computational capacity.  HILLIS, supra note 132, at 87.   
 133  Micheline T.H. Chi & Robert Glaser, Problem-Solving Ability, in HUMAN ABILITIES: 
AN INFORMATION-PROCESSING APPROACH 227, 241 (Robert J. Sternberg ed. 1986).  
CALLEN_FORMATTED.DOCXCALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:50 AM 
1546 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1517 
memories of normal sequences of events, objects, the roles of persons in 
similar contexts and frequent situations, which we can use to comprehend 
new situations.  When information satisfies preconditions for the operation 
of a schema, sometimes called “slots,” the schema is activated, and it 
suggests a decision, or an action such as searching for a piece of evidence 
that may be critical, or even formulation of a new schema.134  It may be more 
difficult for decision-makers to reach good decisions when a schema is only 
a very general guide.  In some cases, when the schema is too general, or the 
actor chooses an inappropriate one, it may be impossible to reach a 
conclusion.135  The stories that Pennington and Hastie discuss are essentially 
the products of schemata, that is, of cognitive strategies. 
1. The Story Model 
With respect to the preponderance standard, the most salient among 
cognitive strategies for allocating limited resources effectively136 is the story 
model.  (Particularly relevant to the Pardo/Allen theory, Professors Hastie 
and Pennington have even referred to the story model as an example of 
“Explanation-based Decision Making.”)137  Jurors seem to use strategies that 
psychologists call the “story model” to organize the evidence they receive 
and to evaluate the parties’ contentions.138  Pennington and Hastie note that 
cognitive psychologists believe that comprehension of any sort of 
communication “is inherently a constructive process, even for the simplest 
discourse.”139  In that light, some process of formulation and utilization of 
stories may be inevitable for any trier of fact.140  In his study of the role of 
narrative and intelligence, Professor Schank found that: 
 
In the end all we have, machine or human, are stories and methods 
of finding and using those stories.  Knowledge, then, is 
experiences and stories, and intelligence is the apt use of 
 
 134  Chi & Glaser, supra note 136, at 241–42.  One way “of describing the weight of 
evidence is to say that it increases with the quality and importance of the slots which evidence 
fills in the schema.”  Craig R. Callen, Second-Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and 
Scheman Theory: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Theory, 66 B.U. L. REV. 715, 723 
(1986).  
 135  Chi & Glaser, supra note 132, at 242. 
 136  See CHRISTOPHER CHERNIAK, MINIMAL RATIONALITY (1986); ROGER C. SCHANK, THE 
CONNOISSEUR’S GUIDE TO THE MIND (1991) and Paul Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, 12 
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 435 (1989). 
 137  Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’ 
Reflections on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 957, 957 (1996).  
 138  See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23.  
 139  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 523, n.11. 
 140  See, e.g., JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN 
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 217–21 (1995) (use of a model to explain judicial fact-finding). 
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experience and the creation and telling of stories.  Memory is 
memory for stories, and the major processes of memory are 
creation, storage, and retrieval of stories.141 
 
Information about the events in suit is a crucial ingredient for story 
formation, but not the only one.  Jurors also utilize knowledge about similar 
events and “generic expectations about what makes a complete story (e.g., 
the knowledge that human actions are usually motivated by goals).”142  In 
addition to the evidence offered at trial, they will make inferences to “fill out 
the episode structure” of the story—whether suggested by parties or on their 
own initiative.143  Individual jurors use pre-existing knowledge, new 
information and inferences to construct one or more narratives, which they 
use in reaching their verdict.144  If jurors could not rely on the organizational 
structure and links to prior experience that stories provide, the sheer quantity 
of information that jurors receive and the “disconnected” manner in which 
they receive it would make the evidence “unwieldy.”145 
The story model takes as a premise that jurors’ use of stories in 
everyday life gives them the knowledge they can employ to assess the 
“completeness of the evidence, or the extent to which a story has all its 
parts.”146  “Missing information, or lack of plausible inferences about one or 
more major components of the story structure will decrease confidence in 
the explanation.”147  The research concluded that each juror constructs a 
story to account for the evidence (or “best” story if she constructs 
alternatives) is the basis of her verdict.148  One should not read that to say 
that jurors will necessarily skate on thin narrative ice. 
According to the story model, jurors who believe that a particular aspect 
of a story necessary to establish a claim or defense lacks adequate support 
will rely on the default rule and find against the party with the burden of 
proof.149  If, on the other hand, the evidence makes jurors confident about 
 
 141  ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: NARRATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE 16 (1995). 
 142  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23 at 522. 
 143  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 527. 
 144  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 522–23. 
 145  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 523.  
 146  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 527. 
 147  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 528. 
 148  Hastie & Pennington, supra note 137, at 959–60.  
 149  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 530–31.  Jurors will similarly decide in favor 
of the default if the story does not coincide with one or more elements of the claim or defense.  
(“We allow for the possibility that the best story is not good enough or does not have a good 
enough fit to any verdict option and, therefore, a default verdict would have to be available.”)  
Id at 531 n. 24; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision 
Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 201 
(1993). 
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their judgment, and fills in necessary elements of the story, they may reach 
a verdict by comparing the likelihood of stories.150 
While the story model holds that development of a story or explanation 
precedes the jury’s decision, it is possible for the jurors to go through a 
number of cycles of story formation before reaching a final verdict.  In such 
a situation, the juror’s tentative decision may influence the final story 
formation.151  Regardless, story formation continues through the trial, and 
during jury deliberation.152  In contrast to the Pardo/Allen theory, the story 
model theory does not assume that the jurors will construct at least one 
explanation in favor of each party, although it does recognize that jurors may 
construct more than one story and pick the best.153 
2. Oblique-Stories 
As Professors Pennington and Hastie conceive of them, stories may 
explain the origin or value of the evidence without directly showing how a 
crime, or central events in controversy, occurred.  That is, they may be 
designed to discredit the opposing evidence.  For example, in discussing the 
O.J. Simpson case, Professors Hastie and Pennington discuss two stories that 
the defense advanced to account for some or all of the evidence without 
giving an explanation of events leading to the death of Nicole Simpson or 
Ronald Goldman.  The first explanation was that the investigators 
prematurely concluded that Simpson was the murderer and were motivated 
to frame Simpson.  The second was that LAPD forensic investigators simply 
bungled evidence collection.154  One might call those stories “oblique-
stories,” that is, explanations of the evidence focusing on how the opposing 
party developed items of evidence in a manner that is not, strictly speaking, 
logically inconsistent with any ultimate fact that the opposing party alleged.  
One test of the quality of a descriptive theory is whether it “saves the data,” 
 
 150  Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision-Making, 
51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 242, 245, 254 (1986). 
 151  Pennington & Hastie, INSIDE, supra note 149, at 201–02. 
 152  Pennington & Hastie, INSIDE, supra note 149, at 201–02.  Pardo and Allen agree that 
story formation may continue through the trial. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234.  It follows 
that their references to the “self-evidencing” nature of explanations are somewhat misleading. 
(For examples see Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 233, 235.)  Similarly, their claim that 
evidence is “relevant if it is explained by the particular party offering the evidence” is flawed.  
If explanations are under construction as evidence is offered, evidence must be relevant if it 
confirms or weakens an existing explanation or could lead jurors to trigger the formation of a 
new story. 
 153  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23, at 531 n.24; Pennington & Hastie, INSIDE, supra 
note 149, at 201.  Professors Vidmar and Hans quote transcripts from the Arizona jury study 
that tend to suggest that jurors constructed only one story in their deliberations.  See, e.g., 
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 135–40, 184–87, 292–95 
(2007).  
 154  Hastie & Pennington, supra note 137, at 966–67. 
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that is, whether it accounts for the empirical phenomena.155  Regarding 
oblique-stories as stories that the trier should compare to narratives that 
include the ultimate facts could require jurors complying with the Pardo/
Allen theory to act in a way that is inconsistent with the theory. 
The use of oblique-stories in the story model suggests a flaw in the 
Pardo/Allen theory as a descriptive theory.  The Pardo/Allen theory holds 
that the stories jurors may consider include stories they formulate (in part 
from scraps of the parties’ stories, but clearly with some material or 
imagination of their own).  Hastie and Pennington say that accounts of the 
evidence that depict it as fabricated or flawed count as stories.  Those two 
points seem to add up, at a minimum, to the conclusion that, in deciding 
whether any one story is better than the others, jurors should consider doubts 
they have about the evidence or the explanation that the parties did not raise.  
If such doubts form part of a story that the jurors might consider the best one, 
then the Pardo/Allen theory’s requirements for a preponderance mean little 
more than limiting the competing accounts that jurors may consider on 
behalf of the non-burden bearing party to theories that jurors can articulate 
to themselves.  That is, where a preponderance is more likely than not, the 
Pardo/Allen theory might limit the stories that jurors can consider on behalf 
of not to articulated explanations in favor of that party.  At most, it would 
suggest that the burden of persuasion requires that evidence and explanations 
in favor of the burden-bearing party be (i) more likely in the aggregate than 
those explanations articulated in favor of the non-bearing party, and (ii) 
sufficiently comprehensive to overcome reluctance to abandon the default 
rule stemming from absence of evidence or doubts about the quality of the 
explanations in favor of the burden-bearing party. 
B. How Theories of Explanation Can Account for Lack of 
Confidence 
An inference to the best explanation is often called abduction, a term 
that Professors Pardo and Allen use as well.156  Umberto Eco, whose 
scholarship includes work on abduction, suggests that when we use 
abduction to create an explanation of facts, as is usually the case in litigation, 
we must also engage in meta-abduction, to ask whether the explanation we 
imagine matches up with the real world as we know it.157  Regardless of our 
 
 155  See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 243 (discussing work of Bas van Fraassen). 
 156  WALTON, supra note 74, at 34; Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 228.  That is not to say 
that equating them is universal, nor that everyone accepts the distinction between, e.g., 
enumerative induction and inference to the best explanation.  Pardo and Allen equate 
abduction and inference to the best explanation and distinguish between enumerative 
induction and abduction, and possible differences among the theories do not seem to be 
important here.  
 157   Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves, Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Induction, 
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cognitive interests, we must ask whether we consider the explanation and its 
supporting evidence adequate for action. 
Detectives are rewarded by society for their impudence in betting by 
meta-abduction, whereas scientists are socially rewarded for their patience 
in testing their abductions.  Naturally, in order to have the intellectual and 
moral force to test, and to ask for new tests, and to entertain stubbornly an 
abduction before it has been definitely tested, scientists also need meta-
abduction.  Their difference from detectives stands in their refusal to impose 
their beliefs as a dogma, in their firmness not to repudiate their motivated 
conjectures.158 
John Josephson argues that, in order for inference to the best 
explanation to work well, it is important to consider the exhaustiveness of 
the set of explanations to which we compared the eventual winner.159  His 
position is that before we decide that the superiority of explanation Ei, as 
compared to explanations Eii-En, warrants taking Ei to be true or acting on it, 
we should consider whether the group Eii-En exhausts the alternatives.  To 
take an example from Conan Doyle, through Sherlock Holmes, “It is an old 
maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever 
remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”160  That assumes that the 
search for other evidence and explanations has been sufficiently thorough to 
make us confident that “whatever remains” is true, or at least an acceptable 
basis for action. 
In particular, Josephson considers it important that the decision maker 
comparing explanations include two special sorts of stories.  The first is what 
he calls the “noise” hypothesis, that all of the evidence is incorrect, or just 
noise.161  “[I]t may be that what seems to require explanation is merely 
coincidence misperception, miscategorization, fraud, perjury . . . or some 
similar phenomenon.  Sometimes the data should be ‘explained away’ rather 
 
in THE SIGN OF THREE:  DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 198, 207, 215–20 (Umberto Eco & Thomas 
Sebeok eds. 2002). 
 158  Id. at 220. 
 159  John R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, in 
THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 287, 293 
(2002).  
 160  Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, in THE ADVENTURES OF 
SHERLOCK HOLMES 476 (The Floating Press 2008).  The idea might have come down from 
Poe.  See explanatory notes in THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra, at 390.  Conan 
Doyle repeats the point a number of times.  E.g., ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE SIGN OF FOUR 
29 (n.d.) (ebook) (“How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the 
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?”).  
 161  John R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of Inference to the Best Explanation, in 
THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC AND COMMON SENSE 286–93 
(Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., 2002). 
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than explained.”162  What I referred to earlier as oblique-stories in the 
Simpson case would fall into this classification. 
The second of Josephson’s “special” explanations is really more of a 
meta-explanation.  That sort of hypothesis would posit that the set of 
explanations that the decision maker is considering rely on past experience, 
and as a result may be inadequate to explain the current situation, which is a 
new possibility.  A trier with little or no experience may fail to make 
sufficient allowance for that lack of experience and jump to conclusions.  A 
case-hardened fact finder, on the other hand, may be overconfident and 
prematurely limit the alternatives he or she is considering.  In assessing the 
degree to which an unspecified new explanation may be better than the extant 
ones, it may be possible to estimate the strength of the potential new 
explanation by analogy to other situations in which the trier was able to form 
a new explanation, and by assuming that the new explanation would account 
for current anomalies in the evidence.163 
Professor Thagard similarly said that his theory of explanatory 
reasoning needed to be “enriched by taking into account judgments about the 
evidence and availability of hypotheses” and that in dealing with novel 
problems a prudent decision maker might suspend acceptance of what might 
be the only explanatory hypothesis.  He suggested that the decision maker 
might, in fact, entertain a sort of “place-holder hypothesis” as competition 
for the only fully developed candidate hypothesis.164 
In a response to a related article by Professor Pardo, Professor Laudan 
argued that to qualify as an acceptable “best” explanation, an explanation 
must not only be better than any competitor, but must “exhibit a high degree 
of coherence with background beliefs, . . . must be internally consistent, . . . 
should explain different kinds of facts, . . . must be simple, and so on.”  In 
the absence of those traits, he argues, inference to the best explanation does 
not justify any inference except possibly agnosticism on the factual issues in 
question.165 
 
 
 
 
 162  Id. at 293.  
 163  Id. at 293–94.  Judge Posner notes that juries help to mitigate judges’ tendency to use 
short cuts based on their experience to reach decisions.  POSNER, supra note 35, at 350–51. 
 164  Paul Thagard, Defending Explanatory Coherence, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 745, 745–
46 (1991). 
 165  Laudan, supra note 15, at 304–05.  Laudan does, however, seem to agree with 
Professor Allen’s earlier relative plausibility theory with respect to the preponderance 
standard.  “Under current rules, if the plaintiff has a better story than the defendant, he must 
win even when his theory of the case fails to satisfy the strictures required to qualify his theory 
as the best explanation.” Laudan, supra note 15, at 304–05.   
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Eco’s, Thagard’s, and Josephson’s arguments suggest that inference to 
the best explanation requires decision-makers to consider not only whether 
the specific stories in favor of one party are better than those in favor of the 
other, but the extent to which the consideration of explanations is sufficiently 
exhaustive.  In Pennington and Hastie’s terms, one might think of that 
judgment of exhaustiveness as a factor in one’s confidence in the specific 
stories.  To put the point another way, Eco, Josephson, Thagard and the story 
model all suggest that the jury should decide in favor of the party that does 
not have the burden of persuasion when the burden-bearing party’s story is 
simply not good enough, even if it is better than the story of the burden-
bearing party—who might have offered little or nothing.  Studies of 
cognition and the Court’s jurisprudence on the sufficiency of the evidence in 
civil cases seem to agree.  Moreover, burdens of proof and rulings on the 
sufficiency of the evidence suggest that standards more stringent than the 
Pardo/Allen theory’s preponderance test have social benefits that judicial 
implementation of the Pardo/Allen theory would not. 
C. The Utility of Burdens and Sufficiency Tests 
1. As a Guide for Jurors 
In addition to the cognitive strategies that yield stories, our decision-
making strategies include defaults or ceteris paribus principles.166  Such 
rules help us allocate those resources efficiently in at least three ways.167  
First, they simplify inferences about the empirical world which we must 
draw from information at hand by focusing our attention on critical points—
the conditions under which the default rule no longer applies.  Second, given 
a particular state of knowledge, they help us decide whether additional 
information is important, and to limit our search for that information in our 
memory or in the world.  Third, given our inferences and information about 
the empirical world, and about the possible costs and benefits of various 
actions, they help us decide which actions to take. 
 
 
 
 166  I meld together here, with default rules, a number of constructs including “fast and 
frugal heuristics,” (Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The 
Adaptive Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 12–18 (Gerd Gigerenzer & 
Peter M. Todd, eds. 1999)); “rule-based realizations” of “q-morphisms” (J. HOLLAND, K. 
HOLYOAK, R. NISBETT & P. THAGARD, INDUCTION:  PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARNING AND 
DISCOVERY 46–47 (1986)), and frames with defaults (M. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 
243–52 (1986)).  See generally, Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29; Callen, Cognitive 
Science, supra note 39. 
 167  See Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 480–81; Callen, Cognitive Science, supra 
note 39, at 1118, 1120–21. 
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The burden of proof standards168 that lawmakers establish help to define 
fact finders’ task by serving as default decision-making standards for the 
fact-finding function.  They require fact-finders to make one particular 
decision unless the burden-bearing party provides the requisite quantum of 
evidence for a fact-in-issue, which may trigger another.  By isolating a few 
critical variables, those facts-in-issue or elements on which the applicability 
of rules turn, they simplify the fact-finder’s task.  At the same time, focusing 
the fact-finder’s task more narrowly helps lawmakers, courts or legislators 
to promote predictable results.169  Isolating the critical factual inquiries also 
helps lawmakers to condition rules on the facts they consider most critical, 
and to establish a default in favor of what they consider the generally 
desirable outcome.170  Not to put too fine a point on it, courts and legislatures 
in formulating legal criteria make the judgment that the factual preconditions 
of that rule describe a point at which the enforcement of the rule has social 
utility that other preconditions would not.  In that light, society has an interest 
in accurate and predictable determination of whether those preconditions 
exist.171  Finally, burdens of proof help organize disputes where multiple 
rules are involved.  For example, rule R may apply unless party P offers 
quantum of evidence Q of facts F1-F4.  If P does, in fact, offer the evidence, 
then R applies unless opponent O offers quantum of evidence Q of facts F5-
F8, and so on.172 
The argument for the comparative standard implicitly ignores the extent 
to which human decision-makers who think P’s story is more plausible than 
D’s, might still hesitate to rely solely173 on the difference in the stories.  
While relying on the better story might lead to the correct decision in many 
cases, where evidence for any story is thin, in particular when it is thin given 
the importance of the matter at hand,174 we might well hesitate to rely on the 
relative superiority of P’s story.  Applying that idea in the context of 
 
 168  Including both burdens of persuasion and production, as well as summary judgment 
standards, which are functions of the burden of persuasion.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253–55 (1986). 
 169  See, e.g., Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 483–85. 
 170  See, e.g., Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 483–85. 
 171  E.g., POSNER, supra note 35, at 341. 
 172  See, e.g., Callen, Cognitive Science, supra note 39, at 1120–21.  See the discussion of 
the St. Mary’s case, infra notes 192 and accompanying text for an example of such an 
allocation. 
 173  This reservation is important because one might also choose to rely on a default rule 
that would ordinarily operate in A’s favor. 
 174  See Ronald J. Allen, Mark F. Grady, Daniel D. Polsby & Michael S. Yashko, A 
Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEG. 
STUD. 359, 388 (1990) (suggesting that the social interest in the accurate application of rules 
warrants use of resources in litigation, i.e., makes the accumulation of evidence socially 
useful.  Litigation is not merely a stakes-dividing device.).  
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litigation, jurors might hesitate to abandon a default standard until they had 
enough information indicating that the balance of utilities tipped in favor of 
a decision for P.175 
Professors Pardo and Allen might argue that courts and fact-finders 
have no valid interest in examining the completeness of evidence, or the 
exhaustiveness of the explanations available, so there may be no reason for 
a fact-finder to apply any standard other than pair-wise comparison.176 No 
one doubts that jurors will often conclude that the parties’ presentations are 
comprehensive, or at least adequately representative.  The Pardo/Allen 
theory holds that we should instruct jurors to rely on their pair-wise 
comparisons, not that we should allow them to do so.  That argues that jurors 
should set aside some of the lessons of their cognitive experience, even 
though the likelihood that they will rely on those lessons relates to an 
important justification of the jury—their ability to bring everyday experience 
to bear on questions of fact.177 
Social utility may require more a standard more exacting than a 
comparison of stories, theories, or explanations, particularly given the rather 
vague nature of The Pardo/Allen theory’s concept of instantiating an element 
of a claim.178  The incentives that parties in a given action have to gather 
evidence, and to formulate stories or arguments, may not correspond to the 
societal benefit of increasing the amount of information, or of refraining 
from applying a particular rule in the absence of further information.  The 
parties may have only a small amount at stake or may hesitate to present 
evidence with uncertain implications for their interests.179  As a general rule, 
the parties have no interest in gathering evidence to vindicate broad social 
norms or to see to it that outcomes at trial are consistent.  Usually, their 
interest is limited to their own dispute.180  Thus, the courts, in common law 
 
 175  One may argue that terms such as “enough” or “sufficient” do not describe a quantum 
of evidence with adequate precision.  Allen, supra note 44, at 1106.  Given, though, that (i) 
computational intractability inhibits the use of mathematical or logical description to model 
human thought processes and (ii) questions of the adequacy of evidence can arise in differing 
contexts, it is difficult to sharpen those terms.  See Allen, The State of Mind Necessary for a 
Judicial Verdict, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 485 (1991) (“No logical algorithms can capture, and 
thus guide very precisely, juror decision-making, . . . with the exception of formal systems 
such as Euclidean geometry.”).  
 176  Cf. Allen, supra note 2, at 428. 
 177  See, e.g., Sioux City & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873); Pattern Civ. 
Jury Instr. 5th Cir. 2.18 (2014). Cf. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 40 (“[J]urors are necessary 
to provide the background knowledge to make contextual judgments about the strength of 
competing explanations and to suggest new ones.”).  
 178  See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 31–34. 
 179  Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 487.  See POSNER, supra note 35, at 349 (“[T]he 
private benefits of searching for evidence may exceed or fall short of the social benefits.”). 
 180  Callen, Adjudication, supra note 29, at 487.  See POSNER, supra note 35, at 349 (“[T]he 
private benefits of searching for evidence may exceed or fall short of the social benefits.”). 
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and interpretive functions, have good reason to use sufficiency tests more 
exacting than those the comparative standard entails.  Jurors, concerned 
about their own interests as members of a broader society, and relying on 
their own cognitive standards, have similar reasons to be concerned about 
the adequacy of evidence before reaching a verdict. 
Legal rules themselves reflect judgments about the need to consider 
adequacy of evidence, even in everyday decision-making.  The reasonable 
person standard in, for instance, negligence law, reflects the need to 
apportion cognitive resources in light of the task at hand—to exercise 
reasonable care.  Professor Cherniak points out that the reasonable person 
standard requires persons to commit cognitive resources, to endeavor to 
obtain information, to the extent warranted by the potential risk and its 
likelihood.181  It follows that one can make, and that ordinary people often 
do make, judgments about the adequacy of evidence, rather than relying 
exclusively on the better of two or more stories as the Pardo/Allen theory 
would have it.  An account of reasoning which includes judgments about the 
adequacy of evidence is indispensable to any understanding of rationality 
which accommodates an understanding of human thought processes and yet 
assumes that interpersonal standards are meaningful. 
2. Sufficiency Tests and Errors of Law 
We have been considering the effect of limited cognitive resources on 
the jury’s role in fact finding.  The judicial system likewise has limited 
resources:  time, personnel, money, and the human capacities of judges and 
jurors.  Moreover, to the extent the court considers the effect of its decisions 
on the other human and economic resources of the society, the allocation of 
those resources182 is constrained not only by their absolute limits, but also by 
the conflicting demands on the resources.  Those resources can be devoted 
to the production of goods and services, or to other activities which may lead 
to greater societal benefits than would the resolution of conflicts in a judicial 
forum.  Directed verdicts and summary judgments limit the expenditure of 
resources in on-going litigation,183 as do other devices for early disposition 
of litigation. 
Judicial procedure in civil disputes, including evidentiary rules, is the 
means by which courts organize data about disputes for resolution of those 
disputes in accord with the applicable legal rules, setting general criteria for 
state action through adjudication,184 not merely a method for conflict 
 
 181  CHERNIAK, supra note 136, at 102–03.  
 182  Professor Lempert points out that unnecessary litigation costs are deadweight losses.  
Lempert, supra note 32, at 470.  
 183  Lempert, supra note 32, at 470.. 
 184  See John H. Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 594–96, 
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resolution as the Pardo/Allen theory suggests.  Unless one looks at the 
court’s role in fact-finding as part of its role in applying and interpreting rules 
of law,185 it is difficult to make sense of common law adjudication, or for 
that matter, interpretation of rules and statutes.  Each requires the court to 
decide whether the facts in a case fit a particular rule, or whether the facts 
are sufficiently analogous to precedent or the pre-conditions of the rule or 
statute to require or allow the court to apply the pre-existing principle. 
Directed verdicts and summary judgments are two of the procedural 
means by which courts decide that a party’s evidence is simply not good 
enough to trigger, or prevent, the application of a rule.  Directed verdicts and 
summary judgments set a threshold, in terms of the non-moving party’s 
ability to satisfy the burden of persuasion, for measurement of the accuracy 
of the non-moving party’s case against the information in society at large.  
In other words, they require that the courts see that facts have a certain 
closeness of fit with the premises of rules and statutes before applying them. 
Courts use burdens of persuasion and production to refine and interpret 
rules of law.  Whenever the courts accept a rule, statute, or interpretation 
thereof as a valid prescription for their action, the prescription must 
necessarily be based on assumptions about the way events normally occur in 
the world.186  The court must make such assumptions in order to focus its 
effort, and the litigation, on determining whether the critical triggering 
conditions for sanctions exist.  The allocation of burdens of proof enables 
the court to implement its interpretation of the rule to fit the world—by 
making default assumptions about the nature of events or evidence thereof.  
It is those assumptions, among others,187 on which the court relies in 
assigning burdens of proof.  The allocation of burdens of proof, particularly 
burdens of production, allows the court to conserve decision-making 
resources for the abnormal or problematic case.  When the court seeks to 
create or reinforce incentives for particular behavior, it has a further interest 
 
603 (1984).  Cf. Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, in ROBERT 
M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNICK, PROCEDURE 219, 222 (1988) (Structural 
litigation which enforces public values tends to abandon dispute resolution model of 
procedure). 
 185  Of course, a court can formulate a new rule.  Although not completely distinct from 
interpretation or application of rules, that possibility does not seem to affect the argument, so 
I have set it aside. 
 186  Consequently, they have valid reasons, in some situations, to refuse to allow verdicts 
to be based on some proffers of statistical evidence. 
 187  On the state’s interest in accurate enforcement, see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 426 (1979).  Predictability is desirable for another reason—to establish an expectation 
that the legal system will predictably apply the incentive in the future, which in turn makes 
incentives more effective.  Cf. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 112–17 
(1984) (In iterated prisoner’s dilemma simulation, most effective strategy is not the first to 
deviate from mutually beneficial course—unwillingness to be first avoids unnecessary 
conflict). 
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in promoting accuracy and predictability for substantive reasons, to see that 
the incentives are properly allocated.188 
The courts, in that light, have an interest in seeing that the party who 
contends that the courts should apply rules in that party’s favor, action which 
affects the allocation of extra-judicial resources, has sufficiently proven the 
elements of those rules.  Accordingly, as lawmakers and agents of the state, 
the courts have an interest in promoting accuracy in enforcement.189  They 
also have an interest in promoting consistency of enforcement, to clarify 
incentives for actors in society at large to avoid the acts which give rise to 
evidence which, in turn, can result in conviction or liability. 
D. Cognition, The Pardo/Allen Theory, and the Court’s View of Fact 
Finding 
1. The Fact Finder’s Story in St. Mary’s 
I do not doubt that jurors in many civil cases use one or more of the 
parties’ stories to a great extent in understanding and assessing evidence.  
Moreover, it seems likely that some jurors assume that each party has put 
forward the best explanation of the evidence that is in its own favor, and 
refrained from constructing or adapting a story on their own initiative.190 
Fact finders do, however, formulate their own stories to explain the 
evidence.  For example, suppose that plaintiff, an African-American, brought 
an action alleging that his former employer discriminated against him on the 
basis of race in discharging him from employment.  Defendant offered a 
neutral explanation for the discharge under the McDonnell-Douglas line of 
cases, that plaintiff failed to discipline his subordinates adequately.  In 
 
 188  See, e.g., Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations and the 
Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics, in REFLECTIONS ON CHOMSKY 255 (A. George ed. 
1989).  For example, William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: 
Characterization, Antitrust Injury and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1257–
74 (1989) points out the effect of the Chicago School model in antitrust law on questions of 
characterization of behavior, antitrust injury and evidentiary sufficiency.  Communication in 
general requires that speakers or authors on the one hand, and audiences on the other, share a 
large number of assumptions about the empirical world.  Otherwise, the audience would not 
be able to understand the content of the communication.  See DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE 
WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 38–51 (1986).  
          Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
906, 910–11 (1931), points out that other, sometimes conflicting, rules of thumb can affect 
the fixing of the burden of persuasion.  “These respectively make it fall upon (1) the party 
having the affirmative of the issue, (2) the party to whose case the fact in question is essential, 
(3) the party having peculiar means of knowing the fact, and (4) the party who has the burden 
of pleading it.”  The point in the text is not that the court always relies on a particular principle 
in allocating the burdens of persuasion or production.  It is, rather, that burdens of production 
and persuasion are important for accuracy in fact finding and application of legal criteria.  
 189  See POSNER, supra note 35, at 340–41; Leubsdorf, supra note 184, at 596–97.  
 190  See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234 n.30. 
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addition, it showed that two African-Americans sat on the employee board 
that approved disciplinary action against plaintiff, and that the number of its 
African-American employees remained constant.  Nevertheless, the plaintiff 
offered evidence that led the fact finder to conclude that the neutral 
explanation (firing for misconduct) was false, given that other employees 
who failed to discipline subordinates received less severe penalties.  Under 
those circumstances, could the fact finder find that the discharge was non-
discriminatory? 
Readers familiar with Title VII jurisprudence will note the 
hypothetical’s resemblance to St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.191  There, 
the District Court held that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance that 
racial discrimination was the motivation for plaintiff’s discharge192 rather 
than personal hostility to him (which the defendant did not offer as an 
explanation for the discharge).  While the court recognized that disbelief of 
the defendant’s explanation would tend to show intentional 
discrimination,193 it reasoned that, even if the trier thought the employer was 
lying about the neutral explanation, such a conclusion would not 
automatically preclude the trier from finding that there was another 
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.194 
We do not know all the details of the trial, but St. Mary’s seems to be a 
good example of a case in which the fact finder worked out a story on his 
own, at least to a significant extent.  Although they have not said so, Pardo 
and Allen would be very likely to accept St. Mary’s as a situation in which 
the trier developed an explanation of his own for the evidence, and thought 
it was at least as good as the one that the plaintiff offered.  Nevertheless, it 
does demonstrate a situation in which the judge as trier of fact found the 
explanations offered wanting, and so formulated one of his own. 
Comparing St. Mary’s to the Pardo/Allen theory, one might pose the 
following hypothetical.  Suppose that jurors applying the preponderance 
standard regarded explanations in favor of each party in a civil dispute as 
possible, and the plaintiff’s as best, but ultimately thinner than they would 
rely on in their own lives.  Should the preponderance standard require them 
to find in favor of the plaintiff?  The Pardo/Allen theory seems to say yes.195  
As a descriptive matter, this does not seem to save the data.  In particular, it 
is very difficult to square with current practice in regard to motions for 
 
 191  509 U. S. 502, 508 & n.9 (1993). 
 192  Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991).  
 193  St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 511; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 
U.S. 133, 148–49 (2000) (evidence sufficient to find employer’s explanation to be a pretext, 
together with evidence showing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, can be 
sufficient to support a finding of age discrimination).  
 194  St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 520–21. 
 195  E.g., Pardo & Allen, supra note 3 at 246–47, 267–68. 
CALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:50 AM 
2018] SPOTTING A PREPONDERANCE 1559 
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law. 
2. Celotex, Reeves and The Pardo/Allen Theory 
In Celotex Corporation v. Catrett,196 the Court held that a movant for 
summary judgment who did not bear the burden of persuasion need not 
produce any affidavits in support of her contentions of fact, but, instead, may 
obtain summary judgment 
 
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party 
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial. . . . “[T]h[e]standard [for 
granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed 
verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).”197 
 
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods, Inc.,198 the Court considered 
whether the district court correctly refused to enter a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict under Federal Rule 50(a) after a plaintiff’s 
verdict in an age discrimination action.  In upholding the district court’s 
judgment and reversing the court of appeals, the Court said that, when a trial 
judge assesses whether the nonmoving party’s evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding in its favor on 
 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review 
all of the evidence in the record.  In doing so . . . the court must 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, 
and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the 
evidence. . . .  Thus, although the court should review the record 
as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving 
party that the jury is not required to believe.199 
 
Neither Celotex nor Reeves seems to reflect a comparative approach to 
the standard of proof.  If the standard of proof asked whether the plaintiff’s 
story was better than the defendant’s, then Celotex would require the 
defendant to offer some affirmative evidence in support of its own motion.  
Otherwise, with the exception of complete absence of evidence for the non-
moving party or certainty that the defendant’s story was right,200 a motion 
 
 196  477 U.S. 317 (1986).  
 197  Id. at 232–33 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)) 
(brackets in original). 
 198  530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 199  Id. at 150–51 (citations omitted).  
 200  Neither was the case in Celotex. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320.  In Catrett v. Johns-Manville 
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for summary judgment without a showing of facts in favor of the moving 
party would be completely pointless.  On the other hand, suppose the Court 
in Reeves had conceived of the burden of proof standard as comparative, that 
is, as a test of whether a reasonable juror could consider the nonmoving 
party’s explanation as better to any alternatives.  It would have made no 
sense to restrict the evidence that the district court could consider in favor of 
the movant to evidence that the jury was required to believe.  Evidence that 
the jury was not required to believe might nevertheless be a potent ingredient 
in a powerful story for the movant. 
Of course, defendants or other non-burden-bearing parties who make 
motions for summary judgment under Celotex may argue that the plaintiff’s 
evidence is consistent with any number of stories.  That still would not make 
the defendant’s story any better—unless we think of defendant’s story as 
“the plaintiff doesn’t have enough evidence to support a verdict.”  There is 
no reason to believe that the Pardo/Allen theory encompasses such a story.  
So that possibility does not seem to give the Pardo/Allen theory any 
sustenance. 
3. When Evidence or Explanations Are Lacking 
The Pardo/Allen theory contends that, in cases in which “neither party 
offers a particularly plausible explanation of the evidence . . . because 
neither side can explain key pieces of evidence,”201 the jury should resolve 
the situation by asking what is the best explanation and ruling accordingly.  
If there is no best explanation, the trier should find against the party with the 
burden of persuasion.202  The authors contrast situations in which “there is 
such a paucity of evidence that it can be explained in multifarious ways.”203  
The Pardo/Allen theory requires that where, as in the first case, all 
explanations are equally bad, the trier should find against the party with the 
burden of persuasion.204 
Further, analyzing what they seem to regard as a typical problem in 
civil litigation, they say that, in cases in which the trier believes the 
probability of the plaintiff’s205 story is less than .5, but still substantially 
 
Sales Corp, 826 F.2d 33, 37–41 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court of appeals held on remand that the 
plaintiff submitted evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that she satisfied 
the burden of persuasion.  
 201  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38.  
 202  That assumes, of course, that at least one of the explanations of equivalent quality 
favors each party. 
 203  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38. 
 204  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 237–38. 
 205  Assuming that the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff.  Pardo & Allen, supra note 
3, at 246–47, once again, argue that judgment should go for the defendant if the evidence does 
not enable the jury to differentiate among explanations. 
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greater than the probability of the defendant’s.  Hypothesizing a situation in 
which the trier believes the probability of the plaintiff’s case is .4 and the 
defendant has two defenses, which each have a probability of .1, they argue 
that the trier should find for the plaintiff.  The Pardo/Allen theory requires 
that the plaintiff’s more probable explanation prevail.206 
Those arguments expose at least two different flaws in the Pardo/Allen 
theory’s position of the burden of persuasion and sufficiency of the evidence.  
The first flaw is the conflict between Pardo and Allen’s quantification of the 
value of evidence and their criticisms of Bayesian models that yield 
quantitative probability assignments for inferences at trial.207  In their work 
on the Pardo/Allen theory and elsewhere they have argued that that fact 
finders’ ultimate decisions cannot be a Bayesian personalist probability.208  
For instance, an interpretation of Bayesian personalist theory to fit the burden 
of persuasion test209 is not convincing because subjective probability 
assumes that we can make calculations in our minds which are 
computationally intractable.210  Accordingly, it is extremely unlikely that 
there are mental states that correspond to their .4 or .1 probability 
assignments.211 
 
 206  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256–57.  After that point, Pardo and Allen argue that 
inference to the best explanation gives a better account of probative value than does a 
Bayesian model, relying on their analysis of an illustration from Kahnemann and Tversky.  
Id. at 257–61.  It is an interesting point, but does not seem to have any implications for the 
burden of persuasion that the remainder of their argument does not offer.  On Kahnemann and 
Tversky’s research program in general, see, e.g., Todd, supra note 120 at, at 52–55. 
 207  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 240 (“Even if the strength of a party’s total evidence 
could be quantified”) & n.49 (citing Ronald J. Allen & Michael Pardo, The Problematic Value 
of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 36 (2007) for reasons why it cannot), 
247–48 & n.70; Allen, Nature, supra note 126, at 376. 
 208  Allen, supra note 126, at 379–82.  
 209  At least insofar as we are concerned with fact-finder’s actions in real time, that is in 
actual decision-making, rather than abstract hindsight.  Real time decision-making seems to 
be the only issue at hand here. 
 210  Allen, supra note 126, at 380 n.25 notes Professor Cherniak’s dramatic example.  
Testing 138 logically independent propositions by the truth table method would take the 
fastest serial computer imaginable longer than the “big bang” theory believes to be the life of 
the universe to the present.  See CHERNIAK, supra note 136, at 93–94 & n.13.  
 211  Professor Nance questions the strength of the computational complexity argument 
against Bayesianism, that is, the argument that comprehensive Bayesian models would require 
processing capacity that humans do not have.  He notes that physicists use complex models 
of physical systems, systems that do not have the intelligence to do the calculations 
incorporated in the model.  Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of 
Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1600–02 (2001). 
          But Bayesian models of fact finding apply to mental states.  Given the computational 
demands of simply assuring that beliefs are logically consistent, there is no reason to believe 
those states are analogous to numerical probabilities, at least in any way that would be useful 
for a systematic prescription of deliberations in a practical amount of time.  Claims of more 
abstract utility should be viewed with caution.  Professor Nance’s attempt to analogize human 
thought to physical systems seems to break down. 
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Similarly, all the conjunction paradox212 shows is that Bayesian models 
do not fit very well with human application of multi-element rules.  That 
simply does not require formulation of a new comparative model of 
inference.  In other words, while inference to the best explanation is very 
useful for understanding fact finding, there is nothing in the conjunction 
paradox that requires us to stop appraising the adequacy of evidence before 
we act, even if the theory on which we might act is the best we can come up 
with at the moment.  The conjunction paradox suggests rather strongly that 
comprehensive Bayesian models of fact finding do not work well, but that is 
all. 
Suppose we set aside the numbers in Pardo and Allen’s thought 
experiment in which the probability of plaintiff’s case is .4.213  That would 
convert the experiment into one in which the fact finder would regard the 
plaintiff’s explanation as more likely (or a great deal more likely) than the 
theory of the party’s opponent, but also think of the fact finder’s uncertainty 
as equally significant—plaintiff’s case and explanations of an unknown 
nature each having a probability of .4 in the mathematical model.214  The 
Pardo/Allen theory seems to implicitly assume that the party with the better 
story is more likely to be right than its opponent, and so should win the 
verdict, despite the uncertainty. 
The Pardo/Allen theory¸ then, is clearly in conflict with research on 
human cognition and abduction that suggest that decision makers may 
validly adhere to default rules (such as finding in favor of the party that does 
not bear the burden of persuasion) when evidence is too thin to justify a 
different decision.  Professors Pardo and Allen have referred to “distributing 
errors evenly among the parties”215 as a norm in their favor.  I understand216 
that a premise of that argument is, essentially, the assumption that the parties’ 
arguments are representative, not only of explanations they have conceived, 
but of those that they might conceive given enough time, wisdom, and 
evidence.  Then, the argument contends, the party whose story is most likely 
is the one who deserves to win.217  On that basis, the Pardo/Allen theory 
requires fact finders to decide in accord with the best explanation, ignoring 
gaps in the information, even those that make jurors doubt the wisdom of 
 
 212  See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 253–56. 
 213  See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256–57. 
 214  The remaining .4 in Pardo and Allen’s example if the parties’ explanations have a 
likelihood of .4 for the plaintiff, and .1 for each of defendant’s two explanations.  Under the 
Pardo/Allen theory, the likelihood of the two defenses should be aggregated, given that they 
are alternatives.  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3,  at 256. 
 215  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 254 & n.100, 261–62; Ronald J. Allen, Factual 
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 N.W. U. L. REV. 604, 614 (1994). 
 216  With help from a conversation with Professor Pardo. 
 217  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 254 n.100.  
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doing so.  That will often be the case.  That is, parties’ incentives will often 
be sufficient to cause them to gather and offer enough evidence to produce a 
result that is accurate—at least insofar as observers of litigation could be 
expected to agree that a particular result was accurate. 
Even so, there is no reason to believe that the parties’ presentations and 
the jurors’ imagination must necessarily yield sufficient evidence or 
explanations to be representative of the information they would have if the 
substantial uncertainty were resolved.  Parties have incentives to gather 
information and formulate new hypotheses to the extent that their benefits 
for the parties (primarily improvement of the likelihood of an outcome in 
their favor) warrant the costs in resources.  After they have done so, a large 
gap in information may still remain.  Jurors may sometimes be able to close 
that gap with inferences, as in the St. Mary’s case, or in situations in which 
they formulate an explanation that fills the gap.  Their resources are 
constrained, and the evidence is a further constraint, but the jury may 
sometimes be able to evolve a new theory subject to those constraints, 
without wasting resources.  Where the gap in information is a gap that 
reasonable inferences cannot close, the court should rule against the burden 
bearing party on a motion challenging the sufficiency of the non-moving 
party’s evidence.  When it is a gap over which the fact finders are unwilling 
to make a leap of faith, they should not come to a verdict in favor of the party 
with the burden. 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE 
The primary goal of this paper has been to suggest that any theory of 
the preponderance standard based on inference to the best explanation should 
take account of empirical research on problem-solving and fact finding, and, 
in that light, that the preponderance standard cannot be wholly comparative.  
Even so, the discussions of empirical research and inference to the best 
explanation in this article provide some underpinnings for an alternative to 
the Pardo/Allen theory’s conception of the preponderance standard.218  It 
seems appropriate then, in closing, to sketch that alternative, at least in a 
preliminary fashion. 
Research on human problem-solving—including the story model—
suggests that the preponderance standard for proof of element E requires that 
the fact finder conclude that (i) E is more likely than not-E, given the 
evidence in the record and the stories or explanations the fact finder is 
considering and (ii) the possible disutility of finding E in the absence of 
 
 218  For related analyses, see Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy: Conditional 
Relevancy and Constrained Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243; Craig R. Callen, 
Simpson, Fuhrman, Grice and Character Evidence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 777 (1996); Craig 
R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1994). 
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further information or explanations does not warrant reliance on the default 
rule by finding for the party that does not have the burden219 are two points 
about this alternative that seem particularly worth making at this point. 
A. Optimization Is Not An Option 
Admission and evaluation of evidence does have costs and benefits, and 
the proposed explanation of the preponderance standard does refer to the 
disutility of entering a verdict in the absence of further information.  It does 
not follow that courts or jurors can identify “the point at which marginal cost 
and marginal benefits are equated,”220 and so apply part (ii) of the 
preponderance test algorithmically.  Nor will jurors know precisely whether 
the gravity of possible errors warrants reliance on the default rule.  It is 
unlikely they, or we, can optimize in that fashion. 
Certainly, benefits and costs are factors in the process of gathering and 
assessing evidence.  Assume that the correct verdict creates a social benefit 
greater than any other response to the problem.  Data may help one to gain 
that benefit, but not without costs.  Accumulation and evaluation of data 
requires expenditure of material resources that the decision maker221 might 
devote to other purposes, and also the expenditure of cognitive resources that 
the decision maker might use for other purposes, such as resolving other 
issues in the same dispute, resolving other disputes, or performing some 
other function that may have a greater social utility.222  In addition, some 
items of evidence that simply confuse the fact-finder may have negative 
utility.223 
In order to calculate the optimal amount (and nature) of evidence that 
one should gather for a decision, one would need to know the values and 
costs of gathering and evaluating individual items of evidence across a wide 
variety of disputes and factual contexts.  One would also have to calculate 
the value of the opportunities lost if resources are devoted to evaluation of 
that evidence.  Considering all evidence that might bear on any one 
problem224 (or trying to satisfy the prerequisites of Bayesian models) would 
require a superhuman effort.  Then calculating the costs and benefits of all 
sorts of evidence, in all sorts of contexts, would require a dramatically 
greater exertion.225 
 
 219  Craig R. Callen, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A Comment on Professor Allen’s 
Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 423, 431 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
 220  POSNER, supra note 35, at 339. 
 221  And parties, to the extent the procedural system is adversarial.  POSNER, supra note 
35, at 346–48. 
 222  See Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 166, at 3, 11. 
 223  POSNER, supra note 35, at 386–89. 
 224  Callen, Conditional Relevancy, supra note 24, at 1260–64. 
 225  Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 166, at 11.  One might argue that the decision maker 
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The theory of bounded rationality, which “takes into account the 
cognitive limitations of the decision maker—limitations of both knowledge 
and computational capacity” is of critical importance.226  That theory helps 
to explain how decision makers can be successful despite the impossibility 
of optimizing under constrained material and cognitive resources.  In order 
to make good decisions in light of their bounded rationality, humans need to 
recognize familiar situations and crucial data, search for new data in ways 
that reflect both benefits and costs of seeking data, and employ simple 
decision rules to help them make decisions based on the critical data.227  In 
other words, they use decision-making strategies, such as the story model. 
Of course, reliance on cognitive strategies is not a guarantee of 
infallibility.  Decision-makers may select the wrong strategy for a particular 
problem, misapply the correct strategy, or simply fail to understand the 
problem ab initio.  Or one might fail to absorb the lessons of prior experience 
correctly, and so formulate a number of strategies that are ineffective. 
In that light, advocates of approaches based on optimizing could argue 
that their theories, at the least, establish aspiration levels, ideals at which we 
should aim, even though we will never achieve them.  Certainly, other things 
being equal, there is no reason why we should not try to improve our 
decisions and gain wisdom in the process.  Yet, studies comparing decisions 
made with simple heuristics and those that follow multiple regression (a 
proxy for optimization) show that the heuristics may be more successful, at 
only a fraction of the cost of regression.228 
Jurors (and probably judges) will tend to believe that the parties have 
put forward the best cases for their positions.229  On the other hand, jurors’ 
or judges’ experience may suggest that additional evidence should be 
available if one party’s position is accurate.  Experience may even teach that 
the uncertainty remaining after the parties have presented their explanations 
 
need only estimate the costs and benefits, but that argument fares no better.  See SIMON, supra 
note 130, at 296 (noting that the difficulty of “[s]olving these estimation problems” may be 
as great, or greater, than the difficulty of trying to consider all data bearing on the matter in 
question).  
 226  SIMON, supra note 130, at 291. 
 227  Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 166, at 12.  
 228  Gerd Gigerenzer, et al., How Good Are Fast and Frugal Heuristics, in DECISION 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 81, 90–92 (James Shanteau, et al. eds., 1999) conclude that simple 
heuristics are superior to multiple regression when the experiments require the strategies to 
“learn” the value of data from one set of problems, and use what they have “learned” to solve 
a different, although similar, set of problems.  Bayesian networks are much more 
computationally complex than simple heuristics or multiple regression, yet perform only 
slightly better than a simple heuristic when asked to “learn” values of data from one set of 
problems and employ those values to resolve a similar set.  Id. at 98–100. 
 229  See ROBERT J. KLONOFF & PAUL L. COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY 
TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS 22 (1990) (jurors will tend to believe parties introduce 
their best evidence, and will not introduce evidence that is not important).  
CALLEN_FORMATTED.DOCXCALLEN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  10:50 AM 
1566 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1517 
(and jurors have tried to formulate some on their own initiative) requires a 
decision in favor of the default.  Even so, the limitations of jurors’ experience 
and cognitive resources will generally not permit them to calculate (i) the 
optimal extent to which the parties should produce evidence, or (ii) the 
precise extent to which they should view under-producing parties’ claims 
with skepticism.  There is no argument here that jurors who rely on their own 
cognitive strategies will be infallible, just that judges and jurors will make 
better decisions if permitted to consider whether the evidence is sufficiently 
complete to justify a departure from the default rule. 
B. Employing ‘Story’ or ‘Explanation’ in Preponderance 
Instructions 
Instructing jurors in terms of explanations or stories, as Pardo and Allen 
suggest, would be unlikely to make their task any easier.  The Pardo/Allen 
theory holds that the preponderance test requires that the jurors “select the 
best explanation of the evidence (or the most plausible version of the litigated 
events),” and that jurors should regard something as “proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence if it is part of their selected explanation.”230 
It seems quite likely that jurors do use the story model, or something 
very much like it, to understand and assess evidence at trial.  Accordingly, 
telling them to reason in terms of stories seems unlikely to accomplish much 
if jurors understand it as intended.  It might even confuse them, since we tend 
to assume that people communicating with us are striving to provide 
information we do not already have.231  In that light, jurors might believe that 
they are supposed to formulate a form of story that they otherwise might not, 
or that the court was doing more than simply reassuring them that their 
normal decision-making methods would suffice.  Moreover, asking jurors to 
select the best explanation of the evidence as a basis for their verdict would 
seem to cry out for further instructions.  In other words, while jurors are 
likely to engage in some form of inference to the best explanation, they are 
unlikely to think of it as such.  A theoretical restatement of that process in 
instructions might create confusion for some jurors that would outweigh any 
improvement in other jurors’ decision making. 
 
 
 
 
 230  Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 266–67. 
 231  See DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 
149–50 (2d ed. 1995); Callen, Conditional Relevancy, supra note 24, at 1284.  
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CONCLUSION 
This draft has focused on what seem to be flaws in the Pardo/Allen 
theory.  In so doing, it has devoted relatively little attention to the Pardo/
Allen theory’s utility.  The authors’ achievement in developing a descriptive 
theory of inference at trial grounded in a philosophical account of induction 
is particularly noteworthy.  Jurors may often behave as the theory predicts, 
but the arguments for requiring them to do so seem to fall short. 
The primary purpose of this paper has been to set out the reasons why 
their comparative standard of proof in civil cases does not seem to be an 
adequate description or an appropriate norm for resolution of issues of fact.  
Empirical research on human decision making suggests that we take the 
adequacy of the available evidence in deciding whether to apply a default 
rule.  Some analyses of inference to the best explanation agree.  The 
comparative approach is inconsistent with current jurisprudence on summary 
judgment and judgment as a matter of law.  In fact, the Pardo/Allen theory 
does not square with the decision-making processes that Celotex and Reeves 
require.  It seems also to underestimate the social and cognitive utility of 
burdens of persuasion and production. 
One of the recurring arguments in the theory of evidence is whether 
“ought” implies “can.”232  In other words, the issue is whether it makes sense 
to set up standards, such as Bayesian models, when research suggests that 
humans cannot adhere to them, and that striving to do so could well be 
counter-productive.  Inference to the best explanation is an “ought” that 
reflects important aspects of the “can” that the story model and research on 
problem-solving suggest.  It may be possible for us to set aside arguments 
that jurors must only compare stories in coming to a verdict—that they 
should not otherwise ask themselves whether evidence and explanations are 
adequate to support a verdict in favor of the party bearing the burden of 
persuasion.  If we can do so, and implement inference to the best explanation 
in conjunction with the story model and research on human decision making, 
we will be well on our way to developing a model of inference at trial that is 
better than anything currently on offer.  And we might even settle the 
meaning of “preponderance of the evidence.” 
 
 
 232  See Mike Redmayne, Rationality, Naturalism and Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 849, 860–66; Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1554–55 (2001). 
